NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS

Quoting a source familiar with the negotiations,Nuclear Iran wrote, “All of the technical issues are resolved except for the Fordow and Arak (facilities)…what remains are issues that require political decisions such as the number of centrifuges as well as a timeline for the lifting of sanctions.”

On Thursday, October 16, hard-line Raja News wrote, “In the remaining time left before the (November 24) deadline, the talks will veer towards discussing an extension, and the P5+1 will certainly ask Iran for more concessions.”

On Wednesday, October 15, IRNA reported that a large majority of Iranian parliamentarians have expressed that they will “(c)ontinue to support the diplomacy efforts of the Rouhani administration and the nuclear negotiating team.”

FRIDAY PRAYERS

Fars News Agency quoted Tehran prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami as saying, “In truth, the sedition (Green Movement) of 2009 stood against the republicanism of our system of governance…I get the sense that some people want to downplay the significance of the sedition, and wipe away (their crimes), but our supreme leader says the sedition is our redline.”

ISNA reported that in Shiraz, prayer leader Ayatollah Asadollah Emani said, “When the West created the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), they also created other terrorists groups outside of Iran such as the Taliban, al-Qa‘ida, and ISIS. Today, these countries once again feel threatened and have formed a coalition to confront the Islamic revolution…but just as they did in the past, they will fail once again.”

Fars News Agency reported that in Qom, prayer leader Ayatollah Seyed Hashem Husseini-Bushehri criticized Turkey saying, “Not only did Turkey not help, but they closed all the roads which caused the innocent people of Kobani to sacrifice their lives. Of course, unlike the arrogant powers, we remain hopeful that the people of this region will quickly achieve victory in their battle against ISIS.”

ISNA quoted Mashhad prayer leader Ayatollah Seyed Ahmad Alam al-Hoda as saying, “Allowing female solo vocalists to perform is in the interests of the enemies of Islam and enemies of our system of governance.”

IRNA reported that Qazvin interim prayer leader Hojatoleslam Abd al-Karim Abedini said, “The persecution of people of Kobani reveals the lying nature of the United States and this coalition that has been formed against (ISIS).”

ECONOMY

ISNA reported that according to preliminary calculations from Tehran’s Central Bank, the Iranian economy grew 4.6% in the period between spring of 2013 and spring of 2014.

A hard-line Kayhan editorial questioned recent announcements made by the Rouhani administration regarding economic growth. Citing faulty stats, the writer asked if these statements are “statistics or dreams?”

Mehr News Agency reported that 670,000 jobs were lost during the first year of the Rouhani administration.

POLITICS

Mehr News Agency quoted Ali Saeedi, the supreme leader’s representative in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as saying, “The United States has pitted all the different Islamic sects against one another…seeking to conduct proxy wars by using Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey instead of themselves.”

SOCIETY

In an interview with ISNA, professor of geophysics at Tehran University Bahram Akashehsaid that due to the Tehran being situated alongside the slopes of the Alborz Mountains, if a large-scale earthquake hits the capital, “(t)here will be wide-ranging catastrophic damage.”

PHOTOS

Iranian women compete in a national dragon boat competition.

Coffee lovers attend the third annual International Coffee and Cocoa Festival in Tehran.

Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami leads Friday prayers at Tehran University.

A Russian Navy ship docks at Iran’s northern Bandar Abbas Port.

Hanif Zarrabi-Kashani

Research Assistant, Center for Middle East Policy

Source: Iran@BROOKINGS

Drugs are prepared for burning during a ceremony in southern Tehran, March 9, 2009. (photo by REUTERS/Morteza Nikoubazl)

In 2014, about 500 Iranians committed suicide by taking aluminium phosphide pills, according to official statistics. This number shows a 23% increase from last year in successful suicide attempts with these pills, commonly known as “rice pills.”

Iranian authorities have recently warned people about the abuse of rice pills, so called because they are widely used in rice factories and warehouses to prevent infestation and mold. They are so poisonous that just a few of them, according to physicians and chemists, would be sufficient to prevent both mold and infestation in an entire rice silo or tobacco warehouse. Aluminium phosphide pills are widely used in suicide cases in India, but in Iran, this is a relatively recent development that went unnoticed until five years ago. Today, the provinces most affected by rice pill abuse are: Tehran, Mazandaran, Lorestan, Ilam and Gilan.

Surviving the ingestion of rice pills is rare. Bahareh, a 29-year-old bank teller in the Lorestan province of Iran, surprisingly survived a rice pill suicide attempt. In an interview with Al-Monitor, she said, “Buying the pills was not much trouble. I went to a nearby herbal medicine store and asked for them. I had heard from a friend whose sister committed suicide that her family had found out, after her sister’s death, that she’d bought the pills used for her suicide from this particular store. The store owner refused, but I insisted, saying that I needed them for a major infestation in my mother’s house. He finally told me to return the following day, which is what I did.”

Abuse of rice pills is not as widespread in Iran as it is in India. Yet, the accessibility and low price could be tempting for low-income individuals adversely affected by mental disorders or suicidal thoughts. Though illegal, some herbal medicine stores carry rice pills. Herbal medicine stores are quite plentiful and somewhat popular in Iran, particularly in smaller cities. Iranian officials have recently made more serious efforts through public announcements to warn people against rice pills by describing just how one dies after ingestion. Rice pills can be either sniffed or swallowed, with a lethal dose being greater than 4 grams. Even in doses under 4 grams, the pills are dangerous and lead to extreme pain, resulting in symptoms like a strong burning feeling inside the body and intense thirst.

Physicians at Tehran’s Al-Ghadir Hospital, as quoted in Iranian media, noted that the government does little to stop the sale of rice pills. The physicians said that though one rice pill could kill a person in 24 hours, the actual time lapsed between taking the pill and death depends upon the strength of the dose and the person’s age and physical strength. Some stronger, foreign-made rice pills, according to the doctors, have found their way into Iran through the black market.

A survivor of rice pills who was institutionalized for several months after her suicide attempt, and is now feeling less depressed, told Al-Monitor, “I went to an herbal medicine store. As soon as I asked for rice pills, the guy working in the store told me that if I really wanted to die, I should take a stronger pill. I told him I did not, that I needed them for treating my infestation problem in my mother’s house. He said they did not carry the stronger kind in their store, but he knew a store downtown that carried it, which also sold the foreign, ‘better’ kind, and that he could make a call for me since his friend owned that other store.”

Iran’s Ministry of Health said that by law no pharmacy is allowed to carry rice pills. Though herbal medicine stores that illegally carry it are far and few, multiple reports state that finding these pills is not tough in many Iranian cities. According to Iranian reports, some herbal medicine stores sell rice pills without the staff knowing their danger or that they could be used for suicide.

Iran’s Food and Drug Administration announced that in Esfehan, rice pill overdoses had led to several youth deaths. These cases were initially reported as overdoses of Ecstasy pills, but physicians discovered that the deaths were in fact caused by rice pills. The conclusion drawn from these cases, based upon further information provided by friends and family, was that the youths were sold rice pills instead of the Ecstasy they were seeking.

The dealers were never caught, and the logic behind their selling rice pills instead of Ecstasy could be attributed to the higher cost of Ecstasy and the ease of access to rice pills.

Bahareh told Al-Monitor about her devastating experience of taking a rice pill. “Almost immediately after I took a rice pill, my father found out, freaked out and took me to the emergency room. The entire process was way too painful, and I feel like it took forever for me to recover. I don’t know if the weaker pills were what saved me from death, or my dad’s quick response. I’ve told my friends that if any of them wants toattempt suicide, they should never consider taking rice pills. Surviving it or dying after taking it is pure hell. I tell people to stay away from rice pills in general. I know I will.”

Source: AL-Monitor

Iran’s navy commander Habibollah Sayyari (C) points while standing on a naval ship during Velayat-90 war game on Sea of Oman near the Strait of Hormuz in southern Iran, Jan. 1, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Fars News/Hamed Jafarnejad)

As global media keep their focus on the Islamic State (IS) and the US airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, other notable, potentially headline-making events are being missed.

On Sept. 20, China dispatched ships to the Persian Gulf for a joint exercise with the Iranian navy — the first time that Chinese warships have ever sailed in the Gulf. The Chinese missile destroyer Changchun and missile frigate Changzhou of the17th Naval Fleet took part in a five-day joint training drill, the aim of which was “establishing peace, stability, tranquility and multilateral and mutual cooperation,” according to Adm. Amir Hossein Azad, commander of Iran’s First Naval Zone.

In understanding the move by China and Iran, one must keep three things in mind. First, it is the first time China, a US rival that does not border the Gulf, has ever sailed warships in the Gulf. Second, these exercises signal a boost in Iran’s position in the Gulf and the region. Third, the move cannot be viewed outside China’s response to the US foreign policy concept of “Pivot to Asia,” which signaled a US plan to shift focus and resources to Asia in response to China’s growing power and influence — a move that China saw as an attempt to contain it.

The Gulf is a globally important strategic location — an area that the United States is willing to spend “blood and iron” to keep under its influence or, practically, its control. For the Gulf to be approached by China, it would — or should — make the United States take notice.

Boost for Iran

In the past, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if it were to come under attack by the United States or Israel for its nuclear program. If Iran were to act on that threat, oil prices would skyrocket. Iran has also expressed discomfort at foreign navy ships sailing in the Gulf.

On April 6, 2012, Iran’s navy saved a Chinese cargo ship from Somali pirates. It has also prevented other pirate attacks on various occasions. It seems there is no need for an external presence in the Gulf since Iran is competent and not in need of China to protect its ships in the Gulf, though Iran would likely welcome the move since China is a close ally. Iran, however, finds it inexcusable that hostile ships from other countries roam the Gulf under the pretext of carrying out anti-piracy or anti-terrorism operations.

In a 2012 interview following the Somali pirate incident, Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, commander of Iran’s navy, said in an interview: “With coordination and cooperation, we can easily provide security in the region because we have mutual interests, and only those with mutual and legitimate interests can truly cooperate. So, two or more countries can easily handle this. That’s why we stress there is no need for the presence of foreign troops.”

Having the support of the Chinese navy puts Iran in a stronger position in the Gulf, even if just symbolically, as the US Navy presence in the Gulf by far outmatches its rivals. The United States, however, might reconsider making moves that would potentially anger China, as the two countries possess plenty of mutual interests.

The governments of China and Iran plan for trade between the two countries to reach $200 billion in 10 years. Furthermore, Iran is the third-largest supplier of oil to China, providing for 12% of China’s annual consumption. Therefore, China would want to protect its interests in Iran, as the United States is doing the same in the Gulf. The recent joint navy drills are a push in this regard.

Chinese interests

In mid-September, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The themes of the visits were similar, as China was assisting both countries in economic development, which would in turn provide economic opportunities for China. More important, the countries are part of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative. Xi promised to cooperate with the Maldives and Sri Lanka on “peace, stability and prosperity,” as well as “port construction and operation, maritime economy and security, and the construction of a maritime transportation center in the Indian Ocean.” These initiatives bring China closer to the Middle East and within better reach of Iran, and show that the recent navy drills are part of a greater Chinese foreign policy.

China is obviously trying to counterbalance the US “Pivot to Asia” policy. China is already experiencing plenty of tensions in the South China Sea, with conflicts over islands and maritime issues with neighboring countries. The United States is exploiting such tensions and concerns among China’s neighbors. For example, Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Vietnam in August, making him the highest-ranking US military officer to visit Vietnam since 1971.

Dempsey’s recent visit comes only a few months after tensions increased between Vietnam and China, as Chinese vessels and Vietnamese navy ships collided in the South China Sea. The Chinese vessels were setting up an oil rig in an area claimed by both countries. In his visit, Dempsey spoke about the possibility of lifting the ban on sales of lethal weapons to Vietnam that has been in place since the Vietnam War. He also mentioned in his visit maritime common security interests, referring to the common rival of China.

With the recent exercises, China aims to break free from the containment and strengthen its alliances and capabilities in the Middle East. Perhaps China also has future plans for a permanent presence in the Gulf, or near it, as the United States has done in the South China Sea. The aims of the drills are similar for Iran, as it wants to strengthen its regional position. Yet, China and Iran cannot compete with the more powerful US Navy. Still, China’s ambitions don’t seem short-sighted; it is clearly planning ahead to better secure its trading routes between Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

The Chinese navy’s visit to the city of Bandar Abbas is unlikely to be the last. It is a reflection of good relations between China and Iran, and the Maritime Silk Road initiative. Should China in the future strengthen its presence in the Gulf and its Maritime Silk Road, the Chinese warships that docked at Bandar Abbas will always be remembered as a turning point.

Source: AL-MONITOR

Noch eine Unterschrift, dann ist dieses Paar verheiratet. Im Iran können Mann und Frau nur mit Trauschein. Die Partnersuche übernehmen meistens die Eltern.O-Ton Schahrus Tawakol, Filmemacher: “In unserer Gesellschaft bist du nur jemand, wenn du verheiratet bist. Seit meiner Hochzeit gehen die Leute anders mit mir um. Ich habe das Gefühl, dass mich meine Familie, meine Verwandten und meine Freunde ernster nehmen seither.”Scheidungen sind eigentlich nicht vorgesehen. Doch inzwischen wird im Iran jede fünfte Ehe geschieden, in Teheran ist es sogar jede dritte. Außerdem hat sich das Heiratsalter erhöht, bei Männern von 24 auf 25 und bei Frauen von 18 auf 22. Viele machen dafür die schlechte Wirtschaftslage und die hohe Jugendarbeitslosigkeit verantwortlich.Ein Ausweg könnte die Ehe auf Zeit sein. Die Zeitdauer variiert zwischen einer halben Stunde und 99 Jahren.O-Ton Mahmud Rahimipur-Jasdi, Geistlicher:”Mit der Zeitehe kann die Gesellschaft die Jugend unterstützen. Wir müssen sie fördern, damit unsere Jugend nicht durch den Westen und nicht-islamische Kulturen vom Weg abkommt.”Doch der Westen ist längst angekommen im Iran. 80 Prozent der Studentinnen hatten bereits einen Freund und sogar Sex. Und das, obwohl Sex ohne Trauschein eigentlich streng verboten ist.

5. Hafis-Dialog in Weimar

Oliver Ernst,  Berlin, 21. Okt. 2014 – Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.

Referenten vor dem Goethe-Hafis-Denkmal in Weimar

Der Hafis-Dialog in Weimar bringt seit dem Jahr 2010 deutsche und iranische Experten zusammen, um aus verschiedenen Perspektiven über die Entwicklungen im Iran und die deutsch-iranischen Beziehungen zu sprechen. Kaum ein Thema ist dazu besser geeignet als die politische Entwicklung im Iran, die sowohl im Iran selbst als auch im Ausland extrem unterschiedlich bewertet wird. Mehrere der Experten waren zum fünften Hafis-Dialog aus dem Iran angereist und brachten ihre aktuellen Erfahrungen in die Diskussion ein.

Bijan Khajehpour, iranischer Wirtschaftsanalyst bei Atieh International, Dr. Rouzbeh Parsi, von der Universität Lund, Dr. Walter Posch, von der Berliner Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Adnan Tabatabai, vom neuen Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient, und Christian Funke, Lehrbeauftragter an der Universität Bayreuth, diskutierten auf dem Panel über das Thema „Die Entwicklung der demokratischen Identität im Iran“. Moderiert wurde die Diskussion von Dennis Schröder, der in Teheran das DAAD-Informationszentrum leitet, das in diesem Jahr seine Arbeit aufgenommen hat.

Im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion stand die sehr dynamische Entwicklung seit der Wahl von Präsident Rohani im Juni 2013. Was bedeutet seine Wahl für die politische Landschaft im Iran, die in stark polarisierte Lager gespalten ist? Welchen Einfluss haben die Ereignisse von 2009, als Millionen gegen die mutmaßlich manipulierte Wiederwahl des damaligen Präsidenten Ahmadinedschad demonstrierten, heute noch auf die aktuelle Situation?

Ein Panelist des Hafis-Dialogs 2014, der 2009 im Iran dabei war und wie viele andere Iraner inhaftiert wurde und nach seiner Haftentlassung aus dem Land fliehen musste, ist der Wirtschaftswissenschafter Bijan Khajehpour.

Sehr präzise analysierte Khajehpour, warum nach den acht Jahren unter Präsident Ahmadinedschad, der die liberalen Reformen seines Vorgängers, Präsident Chatami zurückgenommen hatte und den kalten Wind der Intoleranz durch das Land wehen ließ, Rohani im ersten Wahlgang zum Präsidenten gewählt wurde:

„Im Jahr 2009 war das Regime nicht bereit, eine pluralistische Gesellschaft zu akzeptieren. Heute das das Regime verstanden, dass man der Gesellschaft mehr Raum geben muss und nicht weiter unterdrücken kann.“ Allerdings dienten die aktuellen Verhaftungen und Hinrichtungen dazu, die Regierung von Präsident Rohani „zu unterminieren“.

Die grüne Bewegung, die 2009 nach ihren Massenprotesten unterdrückt worden war, habe man zwar nicht mehr auf der Straße gesehen, sie habe sich aber ab 2010 in eine „online-Bewegung“ verändert und in vielen Blogs engagiert. Tatsächlich gehört Iran zu den Ländern im Nahen Osten, die am aktivsten soziale Netzwerke im Internet und Blogs betreiben. 2013 wurde daher im Iran auch online für eine starke Wahlbeteiligung mobilisiert. Der Einfluss der grünen Bewegung wurde durch den damaligen Slogan der Reformbewegung deutlich „Mousawi und Karroubi: Wir haben damals versprochen, unsere Stimmen zurück zu holen!“ Mousawi und Karroubi sind die beiden Anführer der Grünen Bewegung, die seit mehreren Jahren wegen ihrer oppositionellen politischen Arbeit unter Hausarrest stehen und die 2009 im Namen der Grünen Bewegung Neuwahlen gefordert hatten, da sie die Rechtmäßigkeit der Wiederwahl Ahmadinedschads anzweifelten. Die Proteste im Jahr 2009 standen unter den Motti: „Wo ist meine Stimme?“ und „Gebt uns unsere Stimmen zurück!“

Die Kluft, die es 2009 zwischen Regime und Gesellschaft gegeben habe, sei noch nicht ganz geschlossen, so Khajehpour. Aber die iranische Gesellschaft habe sich in einem „sozialen Sprung“ fortentwickelt. Ein diesbezügliches Phänomen gesellschaftlichen Engagements sei aktuell beispielsweise die unter anderem auch von Künstlern und Sportlern getragene Kampagne gegen die Todesstrafe. Khajehpour beschrieb die gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen im Iran als einen wechselnden Kontrast zu den dominierenden politischen Kräften: Unter dem pro-westlichen Schah sei die Gesellschaft weniger westlich gewesen, unter der Herrschaft des Religionsführers seinen die Iraner dagegen heute weniger religiös. Die drei vorherrschenden und ehemals stark polarisierten Identitäten – religiöser, nationalistisch-vorislamischer und westlicher Ausprägung, passten heute, in einer „moderaten Generation“ zusammen, so Khajehpour.

Khajehpour schlug einen Bogen zu Hafis, dem großen persischen Dichter und Namensgeber des Hafis-Dialogs: „Was hat das alles mit Hafis zu tun? Hafis sei zu seiner Zeit auch ein Dissident gewesen und habe seine Dichtung als Dissident eingesetzt.“ Er zitierte einen Hafis-Vers: „Obwohl unsere Haus sehr gefährlich ist und unser Weg sehr weit – es gibt keinen Weg, der kein Ende hat.“

Walter Posch stellte in seinem Impulsreferat „Das iranische Machtgefüge und Reformperspektiven unter Präsident Rohani“ vor. Er beschrieb die komplexen politischen Institutionen im System der Islamischen Republik und das jeweilige Zusammenspiel bzw. die Konkurrenzen, die teilweise zu einem „doppelten Machtkampf zwischen den Eliten und zwischen den Leuten auf der Straße“ beitrügen. Reformperspektiven unter Präsident Rohani sah Posch als große Herausforderung an, da es nicht allein mit dem Ende der Sanktionen zu einer Lösung der „strukturimmanenten Probleme Arbeitslosigkeit und Unterentwicklung“ kommen werde. Die von Rohani in einem umfassenden Buch dargelegten wirtschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen bewertete Posch eher kritisch: Auf den 600 Seiten käme kein einziges Mal der Begriff des „freien Unternehmertums“ vor. Allerdings hielt er Rohani zugute, dass dieser Regeln aufstelle und gegen Korruption vorgehe. Der Rechtsstaat werde so „irgendwann Zug um Zug verwirklicht.“

Enttäuscht von der bisherigen Amtszeit von Präsident Rohani sind nicht nur die Anhänger der Grünen Bewegung, da ihre Anführer immer noch unter Hausarrest stehen, sondern auch die Menschenrechtler. Die Situation der Menschenrechte beschrieb Rouzbeh Parsi als weiterhin sehr schlecht. Es gebe erhebliche Unterschiede zwischen der Gesetzeslage und der gerichtlichen Praxis. Folter sei zwar gesetzlich verboten, existiere aber. Eigentlich dürften die Iraner per Gesetz ohne Anmeldung demonstrieren, in der Praxis sei dies aber nicht so. Die sehr schlechte Menschenrechtsbilanz sei „seit der Wahl von Rohani nicht besser geworden“. Auch die Beendigung der gegen Iran gerichteten Sanktionen würden in der ersten Zeit – aufgrund der zu erwartenden Reaktionen der gegen liberale Reformen eingestellten Hardliner – keine Verbesserung der Menschenrechtslage bringen, aber in der langfristigen Dreijahres-Perspektive seien diese Verbesserungen wahrscheinlich. Rouzbeh beschrieb die lange Geschichte der europäischen Menschenrechtspolitik gegenüber Iran, die z.B. in europäisch-iranischen Menschenrechtsdialogen mündete. Dialoge über Menschenrechte und gute Regierungsführung setzten aber innenpolitische Diskurse voraus, die sehr langsam wirksam würden, ohne Einflussnahme von außen, meinte Parsi. Wie wichtig der Menschenrechtsdiskurs im Iran heute sei, bemerkte Parsi: „Auch die Leute die gegen die Menschenrechte sind, müssen sich damit befassen – sie haben keine andere Wahl.“

Adnan Tabatabai befasste sich in seinem Beitrag mit dem Legitimationsbegriff einerseits und mit dem Interesse des Systems andererseits. Dabei zeigte er das Spannungsverhältnis auf zwischen dem Bedürfnis, die Stimmen der Bevölkerung zur Legitimation zu gewinnen und der Notwendigkeit der Systemgefährdung durch Antagonismen in der Herrschaftselite entgegenzutreten. Gerade die Präsidentschaft Ahmadinedschads sein von diesen Antagonismen durchsetzt gewesen, die gegen die Interessen des Systems waren. Iran brauche daher eine „Phase der De-Radikalisierung“. Der Sieg des „Pragmatikers“ Rohani war letztlich die Konsequenz aus dieser Entwicklung, da nach Tabatabai „Pragmatismus eher in der Lage ist, die Responsivität des Staates gegenüber der Bevölkerung zu sichern“. Allerdings sei schon vor der Präsidentschaftswahl 2013 klar gewesen, dass, „egal wer Präsident werde, es einer langen Phase der Aussöhnung und Entradikalisierung“ bedürfe.

Christian Funke beschrieb die Bedeutung der Wahlen für die politische Entwicklung und Dynamik im Iran. Trotz des Manipulationsverdachts, der über Wahlen liege, seien diese verhältnismäßig offen und dabei das Hauptinstrument politischer Massenpartizipation. Dabei bewertet die Reformbewegung insbesondere eine hohe Wahlbeteiligung als positiv: „Hohe Wahlbeteiligung macht Manipulation nicht unmöglich, steigert aber ihre Kosten“, meinte er. Dass trotz der Wahlkrise des Jahres 2009 eine hohe Wahlbeteiligung bei den Wahlen 2013 zu verzeichnen war, begründete er damit, dass die Iraner meinten „abzustimmen gibt uns ein Fenster der Hoffnung“ und dass gleichzeitig die Ereignisse nach den Wahlen des Jahres 2009 verdrängt und relativiert wurden. Auch die Stimmung am Wahltag und das iranische Nationalgefühl seien wichtige Faktoren bei der Präsidentschaftswahl gewesen. Die Wahlen des Jahres 2013 stellen im Hinblick auf das Jahr 2009 eine ernüchternde Rückkehr zum status quo ante dar. Funke bilanziert, „dass es auf absehbare Zeit keinen legitimen Raum für grundlegende politische Veränderungen geben wird, der auf der Teilhabe von breiteren Schichten der Bevölkerung und der Zivilgesellschaft außerhalb etablierter Systemkräfte beruht.“

Wie wird es im Iran weiter gehen? In welchem Verhältnis wird sich die mögliche außenpolitische Öffnung zur innenpolitischen Lage entwickeln?

Auch wenn diese Fragen derzeit nicht abschließend beantwortet werden können, so skizzierte doch Bijan Khajehpour einen interessanten Analyserahmen: „Das islamische Regime möchte nie Schwäche projizieren, sondern aus einer Position der Stärke etwas machen“, erklärte er. Die Legitimität im Inneren, die der iranische Präsident Rohani durch den klaren Wahlsieg im Juni 2013 genießt, wie auch die recht selbstbewusste Verhandlungsposition des Iran bei den Nuklearverhandlungen, die durch die breite Unterstützung des zivilen Atomprogramms in der iranischen Bevölkerung abgesichert ist, machen deutlich, dass die Krise von 2009 und das harte Sanktionsregime den Iran nicht in eine Sackgasse getrieben haben. Im Gegenteil: diese politischen Krisen haben den Iran eventuell wieder ein Stück in Richtung einer republikanischen Entwicklung vorangebracht. Ob die demokratische Transformation an Fahrt gewinnen wird, hängt aber auch davon ab, ob die Reformer die urbane Mittelschicht dauerhaft für ein politisches Engagement gewinnen können. Die politische und wirtschaftliche Liberalisierung des Systems ist hierzu aber unabdingbar erforderlich.

Publikationen

• Die iranische Demokratiebewegung holt sich ihre Stimme zurück
  Veranstaltungsbeiträge, Oktober 2014

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a mechanism by the UN Human Rights Council(HRC) to review the state of human rights in 42 states once every 4.5 years. Its recommendations are handed over to the reviewed country which can either accept them or not. The working group in charge of the UPR is composed of UN members, including the State under Review (SuR), but is open also to relevant NGO’s.

The next UPR on Iran is scheduled for the 31^st of October.

Iran implements 2.3% of all recommendation from last UPR

In the last UPR on Iran from 2010, a total of 212 recommendations were placed by 51 countries – Iran accepted 126 recommendations.

To date, it has implemented 5 and partially implemented another 30. The unimplemented recommendations represent the suffering of Iranians under a regime which does not tolerate human rights. You can find an interactive map of all recommendations here.

The lack of implementation doesn’t come as a big surprise for people interested in human rights in Iran but it should shake up a bit the supporters of the regime in Iran. More importantly, it should serve as a clear mirror to shatter the hypocrisy of Iranian leaders who keep on denying that the regime in Tehran is a serial offender of human rights.

Two people who should answer to the UPR but won’t

Two people in particular should have to answer openly to the UPR on Iran.

The first is Javad Larijani, Iran’s human rights chief.

Unfortunately, he systematically denies any problem of human rights in Iran, believes that being gay is a sickness and condones the use of torture, stoning and hanging because they are an integral part of Sha’ariah law. He also denies the existence of political prisoners, religious persecution, and basically any reports of human rights violations in Iran. Based on his modem operandi, he will probably evade and/or deny all accusations and follow up with accusations of his own that the UPR is political and does not accept the cultural and religious laws on which the Islamic Republic of Iran was born.

Chances are, he will evade, deny, accuse and rant profusely and won’t come even close to accept, answer or change anything that turns up in the review.

The second person who should answer to the UPR is President Rouhani.

Rouhani, pegged early on as a moderate, won his presidency on a ticket of change inforeign policy and human rights.

He did live up partially to half of his promises: His open foreign policy led to the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 and to an unceasing list of foreign delegations of diplomats and businessmen to Tehran who are eager for sanctions to be lifted in order to make money…lots of money. The result of his efforts is evident in a big boost in the economy as well as numerous political and economic deals within and outside of the framework of the sanctions.

Unfortunately, Rouhani’s interior policy doesn’t live up to his promises and can be summed up in one word: silence. Rouhani has, for over a year, managed to dodge any questions regarding human rights violations in Iran even when faced with mounting evidence of abuses including state-promoted gender segregation, the highest rate of hangings to date, brutal cases of torture, amputations and floggings, imprisonment of political opponents and journalists, persecution of religious women, gays and religious minorities, clamping down on the freedom of speech and use of the internet and on and on and on.

Here’s a video which outlines the gap between his rhetoric and the reality in Iran.

He has remained silent to date and will probably remain silent.

On human rights and WMD’s

The violations of human rights in Iran and the repeated denials of the regime in Tehran symbolize not only the suffering of the Iranian people but also testify to the regime’s insistence to live according to its own perceptions with total disregard to international norms. The regime in Tehran is not open to criticism from within or from without and prefers to work only through the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the word of their Supreme Leader Khamenei.

It is this mindset that has led to the impasse on Tehran’s nuclear program as a result of multiple accounts of breaches of IAIA requirements and a low level of transparency. The growing suspicions on a military aspect to the nuclear program led to the crippling sanctions which, in a way, brought on the presidency of Rouhani and the need to negotiate. Some commentators believe that Rouhani is focusing first on his foreign policy and that once he inks a nuclear deal he will try to make right on his promises for better human rights. Maybe…or maybe the regime will continue to thumb its nose at its people and the world.

Source: Iran 24/07

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (R), speaks with Turkish officials while meeting with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish prime minister at the time, in Tehran, Dec. 3, 2006.  (photo by REUTERS)

In an Oct. 13 speech marking the new academic year at Marmara University, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked, “What kind of religious leader is this [who] says ‘[Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad is the only one challenging Israel’? Assad didn’t shoot a bullet at Israel. Assad killed 250,000, and you’re still supporting him, sending him money and arms.” The religious leader in Erdogan’s crosshair was Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The Marmara speech was possibly the first time since the Syrian crisis erupted that Erdogan has directly slammed Iranian policy on Syria. The weirdest part of it was his criticism of Khamenei, a clear indication that what once had been strong ties between the two countries has been radically altered by the clash of interests laid bare by the ongoing civil war. Despite deserving to lead the news, Erdogan’s remarks did not receive the media coverage they warranted in Iran, the Arab world or internationally.

While discussing Erdogan, an Iranian official told Al-Monitor by phone, “The death of 250,000 in Syria was caused by nations that back the terrorists in Syria. Turkey is one of those states, and it has full responsibility for the situation today. Mr. Erdogan personally knows that Iran is innocent. Iran is helping a legitimate government restore control over its land and fight terrorists coming from around the globe to kill and terrorize civilians.”

The source also said that Tehran had decided that the time is not yet right to respond publicly to what he called Erdogan’s “irresponsible” comments. He stated, “It will require hours of speaking to remind him of his last visit and what he told the [supreme] leader. We don’t have to time for this right now, and we know this is only for domestic consumption.”

The official further said of Erdogan, “He has to ask himself, who opened the borders? Who gave weapons to these extremists? Who is it that transformed his country into a huge training camp?” He explained that Iran had been surprised by Erdogan’s rhetoric. “This is another indication that Ankara isn’t really serious about cooperating to end the crisis in Syria. It’s such a shame that an essential country in the region is still not determined to fight terrorism, is hesitant to help its Kurdish neighbors in any way and at the same time is attacking those who warned of this end from the beginning.”

Erdogan paid his most recent visit to Tehran on Jan. 29, as prime minister. Supposedly quoting Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Naqavi Hosseini, spokesman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, told reporters Oct. 8 that Erdogan would be paying Iran a presidential visit and meet his counterpart and other high-ranking officials. It is not known whether the visit is still on after Erdogan’s critical remarks.

Turkish-Iranian relations appear to have peaked during Erdogan’s January visit and the signing at that time of a strategic cooperation treaty. Khamenei’s words were as clear as day, with his being reported as saying that Iranian-Turkish relations were at their best in centuries and that both countries must seize the opportunity to solidify their relationship. Erdogan offered that Iran felt to him like a second home. So what happened? Why do Turkish-Iranian relations now appear to be going in the opposite direction?

As with most other shake-ups in the region, Syria appears to be the problem. Both countries earlier expressed a keenness to move toward compromise, but events on the ground threw barriers in the way. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the formation of the US-led coalition imposed on all parties the need to move forward with plans to deal with the Middle East’s new sick man, i.e., Syria. There was no more time for diplomacy or kind words, as the map of regional alliances became clearer by the day. As it turned out, Turkey and Iran were not in the same boat. Each backed a different set of allies on the ground and around the region.

Turkey’s strategist and prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has been seriously thinking about his country’s role in the new regional order. On Oct. 19 he declared that Turkey would not become the guardian of the Sykes-Picot borders. Ankara is certain that the situation that prevailed before the war against IS and thecoalition airstrikes has been superseded. It is therefore aiming to secure some gains before shooting a bullet. It knows well that what applies today — when the coalition needs to make use of its borders and position — will not apply after the coalition prevails (should that become a reality).

The removal of Assad is Turkey’s first priority. This need not be achieved directly, but Ankara believes it should be acknowledged as a necessity in solving the Syrian crisis. Full control by Turkey’s allies over northern Syria, from the border with Iraq to the Mediterranean, would ease Ankara’s concerns over the possible establishment of a Kurdish state on its border, in addition to being an essential element in defeating Assad’s regime and hastening its fall. Northern Syria would become a safe haven for the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition to establish their control and expand under coalition airstrikes. Therein lies Turkey’s problem with Iran.

The Iranians want to rid the region of IS at any cost. Although it is true that they refuse to support or bless the US-led coalition and have criticized its effectiveness, they know that the strikes are succeeding in keeping IS somewhat in check. They are also thinking of their post-Sykes-Picot status, or at least about keeping the sick man alive to the extent possible to prevent losing too much of the ground they have gained during the last decade.

To Iran, the fall of Assad would mean the loss of Syria as a whole and the isolation of Hezbollah within the borders of Lebanon. It would also mean that Iranian-influenced Iraq, where most Sunni and Kurdish regions are outside the government’s control, would be under threat. In such a scenario, Iran’s influence in the Levant would be severely scaled back. This possibility has pushed Iran toward ditching its usual “policy of ambiguity” concerning its presence on the ground in the region. Today, images and statements touting itsmilitary role in Iraq have became common, even exaggerated, sending a clear signal that it has boots on the ground and that it is ready to do whatever necessary to achieve its objectives.

The clash between Iran and Turkey is likely to intensify, but only in regard to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. These descendants of the Safavid and Ottoman Empires will always keep their differences away from their borders and mutual interests. Thus, it is unlikely that Turkish-Iranian economic relations will suffer. Business should proceed as usual.

Source: Al-Monitor

Iranische Frauen werden selbstbewusst: Sie trennen sich von ihren Männern und feiern das ganz offen.

Das Selbstverständnis der Iranerinnen hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren verändert: Frauen in der Hosseyniyeh Ershad Moschee in Teheran. (Archivbild) Bild: Keystone

Iraner haben einen Hang zur sorgsam gepflegten Melancholie. Aber sie feiern auch gern, die unfrommen Partys der Besserverdienenden von Teheran sind so legendär, wie sie bei den Sittenwächtern der Islamischen Republik verrufen sind. Nun müssen die obersten Geistlichen sich noch mehr grämen: Iranische Frauen trennen sich immer häufiger von ihren Ehemännern und schmeissen zur Feier des ersten Tages ohne Gatten auch noch ausgelassene «Scheidungspartys». «Satanisch» war das Einzige, was einem der Islamgelehrten zu der Tatsache einfiel, dass die Frauen im schiitischen ­Gottesstaat auch im Eheleben eigene Wege gehen und diese nicht den Vorstellungen der Männer entsprechen.

Die Scheidungsrate ist auf 20 Prozent gestiegen in einem Staat, in dem die Ehe die einzige rechtmässige Form von Partnerschaft ist, die Lebensgemeinschaft häufig von den Eltern arrangiert wird und die Regierung eine hohe Kinderzahl «im Interesse der starken Nation» ein­fordert.Scheidung auf Wunsch der Frau ist da nicht gern gesehen.

Dass dennoch immer mehr Frauen aus der Ehe flüchten und den Abschied auch noch feiern, zeigt: Das Selbstverständnis der Iranerinnen hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren verändert. An den Unis sind 60 Prozent der Studenten Frauen, im Arbeits- und Geschäftsleben spielen sie eine andere Rolle als in betont konservativen Gesellschaften wie Saudiarabien, Kuwait oder Jordanien: Viele Iranerinnen sind finanziell nicht mehr so abhängig von ihren Ehemännern. «Früher heiratete die Frau und fügte sich», zitiert die Agentur Reuters einen Soziologen. «Heute geht sie, wenn sie unglücklich ist.»

Vollständiger Artikel

Von Teheran aus fuhren wir durch das Elbrus Gebirge zum Kaspischen Meer. Über Maschhad führte unsere Reiseroute durch Turkmenistan und endete in der Usbekischen Hauptstadt Taschkent.

Von Teheran aus fuhren wir durch das Elbrus Gebirge zum Kaspischen Meer. Über Maschhad führte unsere Reiseroute durch Turkmenistan und endete in der Usbekischen Hauptstadt Taschkent. We drove from Tehran through the Elbrus Mountains to the Caspian Sea. After visiting Mashhad we crossed Turkmenistan and finished our trip in the capital city of Uzbekistan Tashkent.
Unsere Fahrräder sind eingepackt am Flughafen Zürich. Our bicycles are packed at Zurich Airport.
Übernachtung im Kapsel-Hotel in Moskau beim Warten auf den Anschlussflug. Night at the Capsule Hotel in Moscow while waiting for the flight connection.
In Tehrean fotografiert Guang in einen Spiegel während Rainers Haare geschnitten werden. In Tehrean Guang is taking a photo of a mirror while Rainer gets a haircut.
Typisches Essen: Grilliertes mit Reis und frischem Brot. Typically barbecued meats come with rice and freshly baked bread.
Der Golestan Palast vom Shah Nasser al-Din in Teheran. The Golestan Palace of Shah Nasser al-Din in Teheran.
An jeder Ecke gibt es frisch gepressten Fruchtsaft. At every corner freshly made juice is available.
Granatapfelsaft ist fertig. Pomegranate juice is ready.
Dichter Verkehr in Teheran. Rush hour in Teheran.
Die Kunst beim Brotbacken besteht darin, die Brote aus dem Ofen zu nehmen bevor sie in das Feuer fallen. The skill of bread baking is to take out the bread before falling off into the fire below.
Rainer mit einem noch heißen Brot. Rainer with his hot bread.
Das Brot essen wir sofort als es noch warm ist. We eat the bread when it is still warm.
Mit einem Leihwagen verlassen wir Teheran und fahren durch das Elbrus Gebirge. We leave Teheran with our rental car and cross the Elbrus Mountains.
Serpentinen zu einer Flussoase. Road to a river oasis.
360° Panorama.
Wanderung über einen (fast) ausgetrockneten Salzsee. Hike across an almost dry salt lake.
Salzsee mit Gebirge im Hintergrund. Salt lake with mountains in the background.
Der heilige Schrein in der konservativen Stadt Qom. The Holy Shrine of the conservative city Qom.
Letztes Lächeln. Last laugh.
Vor dem heiligen Schrein in Qom. In front of the Holy Shrine in Qom.
Traditionell wird auf einem Teppich gegessen. Traditionally, dinner is eaten on a carpet.
Marmor Thron vom Shah Fath Ali. Marble throne of Fath Ali Shah.
Wanderung im Elbrus Gebirge. Hiking in the Elbrus Mountains.
Karawanserei in Qazvin. Caravanserai in Qazvin.
Traditionelles Outfit – jedoch beim Fotograf. Traditional clothing – at a photographer.
Ein Seelöwe zeigt Kunststücke. A sea lion shows his skills.
Die saure Kamelmilch ist nicht Jedermanns Sache. The sour camel milk is not for everyone’s taste.
Turkmenen im Nordiran. Turkmen in the North of Iran.
Ziegenschäfer. A goat stockman.
Das riesige Turmgrab “Kavus” in der Stadt Gonbad. Winziger Rainer unten links. The giant Tower Tomb “Kavus” in Gonbad and tiny Rainer in the lower left.
Gebetsteppiche. Praying carpets.
Vorbereitete Gebetsteppiche vor dem heiligen Schrein in Maschhad. Readily unfolded praying carpets in front of the Holy Shrine in Mashhad.
360° Panorama.
Nach Rückgabe des Leihwagens beginnt unsere Radtour in Maschhad. After returning our car in Mashhad we commence our bicycle trip.
Stadtverkehr in Maschhad. Morning traffic in Mashhad.
Die erste Trinkpause nach 30 km Fahrt. First drinking break after 30 km cycling.
Übernachtung bei einer Privatfamilie. Staying overnight with a family.
Verabschiedung am nächsten Morgen. Good-bye in the morning.
Letzte Etappe zur Grenze nach Turkmenistan. Last leg to the border of Turkmenistan.	Bericht: Rainer Mautz (Quelle)

Iranian worshippers shout anti-U.S. slogans during a demonstration by hardline group Ansar Hezbollah to protest against the social corruption and unislamic outfits worn by women after Friday prayers ceremonies in Tehran, April 28, 2006. (photo by REUTERS/Morteza Nikoubazl)

In response to a number of acid attacks on women in the city of Esfahan, Iranian President HassanRouhani has ordered the Interior Ministry, Intelligence Ministry and Justice Ministry to pursue the case. Tehran’s Friday Prayer leader Ayatollah Mohadi Kermani has also said that the attackers must be given the “maximum punishment.”

Protests erupted in Esfahan and the capital Tehran over the attacks, which left a number of young women disfigured. Some at these protests blamed the authorities for not protecting women from violence and supporting legislation that offers legal protection to vigilante “vice groups” engaged in the Islamic teaching of “enjoining good and forbidding wrong.”

These vice groups, often organized around Ansar-e Hezbollah, have threatened that if the administration does not take action to enforce hijab laws, they will take to the streets and enforce it themselves, despite hijab-law enforcement falling under the jurisdiction of the police and not the administration. Iranian authorities have claimed that Ansar-e Hezbollah or other vice groups were not involved in the attacks, and a number of officials have suggested the violence was the work of “anti-social” individuals.

During an Oct. 22 trip to Zanjani, Rouhani condemned those who believe that “enjoining good and forbidding wrong” is their duty alone, and use the teaching as a partisan tool. He said it should be used to “bring society closer together [rather than] to create separation and divisions,” and asked parliament to consider wording the law in a manner that would “create more unity in society.”

Parliament member Laleh Eftekhari criticized Rouhani for his comments. “I did not expect this from a president who studied in the seminary,” she said, adding that “enjoining good and forbidding wrong” is not just about hijab and modesty laws, but relates to all aspects of governance.

Hard-line cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami called for the attackers to be punished both for injuring the victims and causing “damage to the dignity of the Islamic system.” He called, however, for media outlets that blamed vice groups for the attacks to be punished as well. He said, “These websites and newspapers that have accused the Islamic system and the religious forces must be pursued. The owners and managers must be punished and held accountable for their lies.”

Khatami dismissed criticism of the bill, saying that it “makes clear the framework” in which these groups will operate.

The Ansar-e Hezbollah website Yalarasat alHussein claimed that the protests in response to the acid attacks “proved that the protesters do not have concerns for society, but rather seek to challenge Islamic laws and constitutional laws.” The article stated that some of the chants and posters in front of the parliament building in Tehran questioned Iran’s hijab laws and the proposed law to protect vice groups. It condemned any connection between the violence and these laws, and quoted officials as equating connecting the two with “inciting public opinion.”

Source: AL-Monitor

NACH DEM SINNLOSEN TOD DER IRANERIN REYHANEH JABBARI RUFT BILD AUF:

Stellen Sie den Iran zur Rede!

Rufen Sie bei einer der iranischen Vertretungen in Deutschland an, lassen sich das Unfassbare erklären! Machen Sie Ihrem Ärger Luft über diesen sinnlosen Tod!

Hier die Kontakt-Daten:

Iranische Botschaft in BERLIN: 030-84353399 oder 030-84353135 oder 030-84353145

Iranisches Generalkonsulat in FRANKFURT AM MAIN: 069-56000734

Iranisches Generalkonsulat in HAMBURG: 040-5144060

Iranisches Generalkonsulat in MÜNCHEN: 089-45239690

Hintergrund: So geriet Jabbari in die Mühlen der iranischen Justiz

Mit gerade mal 19 Jahren traf die junge Innenarchitektin auf den Mann, der ihr Leben – auf grausame Weise – für immer verändern sollte. Der Arzt und laut „New York Times“ Geheimdienstler Morteza Abdolali Sarbandi (47) bittet sie, seine Praxis einzurichten.

Ihre Darstellung: Eine abscheuliche Falle!

Hardliner mobilisieren um Besetzungen in Parlament und Expertenrat.

Das Wetter hatten sie auf ihrer Seite. Strahlender Sonnenschein begrüßte die rund 80 engagierten Läufer, die sich am Sonntag am Beueler Rheinufer zum “Lauf für die Menschenrechte” versammelten. Mit dem von Amnesty International (AI) organisierten Lauf, der bereits zum 16. Mal in Bonn stattfand, wollten die Teilnehmer ein Zeichen setzen.
Zoom
Rund 80 Läufer nahmen am Friedenslauf teil. Foto: Max Malsch
Sie joggten für die Rechte von Journalisten im Iran. Um den Körper trugen sie Schilder mit der Aufschrift “Freiheit für Abedini Nasr”. Der iranische Journalist wurde 2010 im Zuge einer Verhaftungswelle gegen Menschenrechtsaktivisten im Iran verhaftet und befindet sich seitdem in Gefangenschaft, wo er Berichten zufolge auch misshandelt wurde.

In Briefen an den iranischen Botschafter appelliert AI regelmäßig für die Freilassung des Journalisten. Durch den “Lauf für die Menschenrechte” sollte die Öffentlichkeit für das Thema sensibilisiert werden. “Solche Aktionen sind für uns enorm wichtig. Denn die Öffentlichkeit ist unsere wichtigste Waffe”, erklärte Jamil Balga, der Gruppensprecher der AI-Bezirksgruppe Bonn-Mitte. “Und in 30 bis 40 Prozent der Fälle führen unsere Protestaktionen auch zum Erfolg.”

Vollständiger Artikel

Iran