The following is a monthly report summarizing the human rights status in Iran in August / September (Solar calendar, month of Shahrivar), 2014. This report has been prepared by the office of Statistics and Publications of the Human Rights Activists Association of Iran. Considering the ongoing suppression and ban on independent human rights activists and organizations in Iran, this report may not be considered a comprehensive and complete reflection of the current status of human rights situation in Iran. It should be noted that the department of Statistics also publishes an annual report about the human rights conditions in Iran in the form analytical and statistical report.

An overview of the human rights situation in Iran in August

Human rights violations in Iran remain a major concern, especially with the dramatic growth of executions in Iran in the month of August / September 2014. The increase in the number of executions is twice the corresponding month last year. The month started with horrible news of 14 executions over a course of 4 days in Bandar Abbas, Sari, Borazjan, and Kerman, indicating the start of a terrible month for the human rights activists in Iran. The worst cases were public execution of 5 prisoners in the province of Fars, and 8 prisoners in the province of Kerman which was carried out secretly in collaboration between the justice system and the security forces.

The UN secretary general, Ban Ki Moon, warned against the significant increase in the number of executions in Iran and accused the new president of Iran, Hasan Rouhani, to not keeping his promises on the human rights issues in Iran. As usual, the Iranian authorities reacted to these allegations by denying the violations of human rights in the country.

One significant case of human rights violation in Iran is the case of a survivor of execution who has been sentenced to death for the second time. Other cases include four times death sentence, 20 years in prison, and 173 lashes for a prisoner nicknamed black spider; confirmation of death sentence for the Dena National Park security force for the third time; chaos in the Ghezel-Hesar prison of Karaj that led to the execution of 14 prisoners; and killing of 10 prisoners by the security forces.

The deputy of the Social Affairs and Prevention of Crime in the Justice office in the province of Kerman clearly indicated that the individuals charged with drug trafficking  and those involved in selling Methadone can be sentenced to prison, fine and lashes or in some cases they may be sentenced to death.

The death of a teenage boy named Ali Akbar Younesi in Hamedan, who tried to simulate hanging of prisoners was another aspect of the terrible human rights situation and conducting the death sentences in public. The authorities have always defended the executions decrees as a method to reduce the level of crime whereas according to their own reports the number of murdering has significantly increase to about 26.5, which indicates invalidity  of their claims.

This month also continued with the continuous violations of the fundamental rights of religious and ethnic minorities. These violations included obtaining commitment from the immediate family of the dead Baha’i people in Semnan; arrest of Noush Azar Khanjani; Farhad Eghbali’s transfer to the prison; re-arrest of Saghi Fadayi; arrest and interrogation of five Baha’is in Shahin Shahr. Perhaps one of the most controversial news in this respect was the ban on higher education of Baha’I citizens of Iran despite Hasan Rouhani’s promises to stop this tyranny.

The Iranian citizens converted to Christianity were also greatly suppressed by the security forces in Tehran and Isfahan. Reza Rabbani, Abdolreza Ali (Mthias) Haghnejad, and Behnam Irani were three Christian ministers who were sentenced to death with charges of “Moharebeh” and “Fighting against God. This news was significantly worrying for the human rights activists in Iran.

This month was particularly difficult for the Iranian Sufis who peacefully protested against the suppression and continual pressure applied by the security forces. They gathered in front of Justice Office in Tehran; however their gathering faced brutal attack by the security forces that led to many wounded and arrested individuals. It is estimated that at least 800 people arrested in this gathering alone, which clearly indicates lack of freedom and principle rights of the people in Iran.

With respect to Children rights, this report highlights the news of security forces putting pressure on the working kids to leave their tents as well as the recent news of many kids suffering AIDS as a consequent of rape. In the area of workers and unions, this month was very controversial in particular in view of the widespread and unprecedented strike of the workers of Bafgh which resulted in the travel of two special government representatives. The report also highlighted the news of the strike of about 150 workers at Gilana Tile Company; the gathering of the workers of a mine located in the village of Sangrood (in Gilan province) protesting against two months postponing of their salaries; and finally the news of verdict against four workers at the Razi Petrochemical Co. to six months jail and fifty lashes by the local General Court, Branch #10.

In the area of LGBT, this report has also highlighted the arrest of two LGBT activists and another citizen in a beauty salon by security forces in the last month. This is despite the fact that the former president of Iran had publically denied the existence of gay and lesbians in Iran.

According to the deputy president of Iran the water crisis is the most important problem in Iran, and over the last month a number of reports have been published around the water shortage, draught, fire, and destroying the natural resources

Particular attention to the violations of human rights

This section of report pays specific attention to the more sensitive cases of human rights violations. Obviously, this specific attention doesn’t mean that these kinds of reports reflect the severity and dimension of the human rights violations.

Amongst these cases, the gathering of some of the Shin Abad schools girls in front of the office the president has drawn specific attention. The parents of these students expressed their frustrations with respect to the unfulfilled promises by the government and insurance companies.

Moreover, the arrest and continuing imprisonment of Ghoncheh Ghavami, the Iranian-British citizen, as well as the appeal court for Fatemeh Hashemi, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s daughter, were widely reflected in the media.

One of the most respected reports on the violations of human rights in Iran was re-arrest of Arash Sadeqi, the former political prisoner, and his wife. Moreover, in a case referred to as “Happy”, convicting six Iranian youngsters to six months suspended jail and 91 lashes was another important case of human rights violation.

Human rights reports in the shadow of “Little Attention”

In contrast to the previous section of the report, many of the human rights reports faced “little attention” or even no attention by the media including social media activists. This situation could facilitate even further violations of human rights in Iran.

One of the significant reports that did not earn lots of attention in the media was the news of existing more than 300 children without birth certificate in the city of Nimrouz. According to the head of Education office of the city of Nimrouz, these children suffer from lack of education in the absence of these identification documents. Moreover, the continuing strike of the Gonabadi Sufis, who also published an statement named “last will” was not widely respected in the media. Other cases include 56 deaths resulted from work place hazards; hand amputation of five individuals in Isfahan (that even the local justice office expressed concerns over publicizing this news in the media); dismissal of four workers of an industrial company in Saveh after attending a demonstration; and the death of a worker in an explosion and following 24 hours of obligatory work time were also amongst the reports that faced little attention.

It is important to note that widespread violations of the Iranian Sunni minority were major cases of human rights violations. However, these reports were not significantly reflected in the media and amongst Iranian citizens as a result of ongoing political developments in the Middle East. The situation of about 34 Sunni individuals, the majority of whom are devoid of any violence, and even the possibility of execution of four Sunni activists that result in public condemnation of Amnesty International were not widely reflected in Iranian public and social media.

The office of Statistics and Publication of Human Rights Activists Association in Iran

Source: ZAMANEH_UR:

The lawyer for a number of Facebook users who were arrested by Iranian authorities for their cyber activities reported on Monday September 29 that his clients have “accepted some of their mistakes and expressed remorse” in the appeals court.

Caught redhanded!
(cartoon by Mana Neyestani, Iran Wire)

The appeals court hearing of eight Facebook users was held on Sunday September 28 in Tehran, according to IRNA. Their lawyer, Shima Ghosheh, reports that in addition to presenting their defence at the trial, the accused called for Islamic mercy.

He added that seven of the accused were present in court and only one, who has been out on bail, was not in court. Ghosheh said the hearing took four hours and, unlike the preliminary court, the accused were given a chance to speak and defend themselves.

The eight Facebook users were arrested in July and charged with “assembly and collusion against national security”, “propaganda activities against the regime”, “insulting sanctities” and “insulting the senior government officials and other individuals.”

In the preliminary court, they were sentenced to stiff prison terms, monetary fines and lashes in the preliminary court.

Dawud Gholamasad

Die schier unlösbaren außenpolitischen Probleme Irans

„Ich bin ein Revolutionär und kein Diplomat“ („Der Führer der Revolution, Khamenei)“

Iran als Vaterland der „Gläubigen der Welt“ („Om ol Ghora“) und als „Nationalstaat“

Die Bedeutung der Äußerungen Khamenei – er sei ein Revolutionär und kein Diplomat – als Legitimation seiner „Unnachgiebigkeit“ in den Verhandlungen über das Nuklearprogramm Irans und seine gleichzeitige „taktische Flexibilität“ in den Verhandlungen als „heroisches Reaktionsvermögen“ angesichts der unübersehbaren Gefährdung seines Reimes aufgrund der internationalen Sanktionen, dokumentieren die Lage, in die er sich und den Iran hineinmanövriert hat. Er hat zwar mit seiner scheinbar „revolutionären“ Haltung gegenüber den „gierigen Verhandlungspartnern“, die „zu viel verlangen“, Zeit gewonnen um die wissenschaftlichen und technischen Potentiale zur Herstellung der Atombombe herbeizuschaffen. Er hat aber damit die Kosten einer friedlichen Lösung des Problems unermesslich erhöht, ohne je die Chance zu bekommen, Iran tatsächlich zu einer Atommacht zu machen. In eine Sackgasse geraten, scheint er einzusehen, dass seine Strategie der Herrschaftssicherung mittels Atombombe selbst herrschaftsgefährdend wurde. Deswegen durften die Verhandlungen erneut aufgenommen werden.

Aber selbst nach einer Verlängerung der Verhandlungsdauer bestehen immer noch ernsthafte Zweifel über eine für beide Seiten zufrieden stellende Einigung bis Nov. 2014. Dies nicht deswegen, weil unlösbare technische Probleme vorliegen, sondern weil die Zielkonflikte der Verhandlungsparteien schwer zu vereinbaren sind: Während die „internationale Gemeinschaft“ einen atomfreien Iran anstrebt, versucht Irans „Revolutionsführer“ die Chance einer atomaren Bewaffnung weiterhin offen zu halten, in dem er die Eliminierung der technischen Voraussetzungen des Baus und der Nutzung der Atombombe nicht zustimmen will. Darauf insistiert er weiterhin, obwohl ein Verpassen dieser letzten Chance einer diplomatischen Lösung des Problems erhebliche Folgen für die weitere Existenz der „Islamischen Republik“ haben könnte. Nicht nur wären mögliche militärische Interventionen zur Zerstörung des atomaren Potentials Irans nicht mehr ausgeschlossen. Auch die Fortsetzung der Wirtschaftssanktionen würde früher oder später dem Regime die materielle Existenzgrundlage entziehen, weswegen sich der Revolutionsführer widerwillig zu Verhandlungen bereit erklärte und zugleich ihre Unfruchtbarkeit betonnte. Dabei sind die wirklich Notleidenden jeder weiteren Fortsetzung der Sanktionen diejenigen Iraner, deren Mehrheit schon jetzt unter der Armutsgrenze dahin vegetiert. Aber „der Führer“ würde nur dann den Forderungen der „internationalen Gemeinschaft“ nachgeben, wenn er tatsächlich die existentielle Gefährdung des Regimes des „Führers der Gläubigen der Welt“ nicht mehr abzuwenden glaubt. Warum?

Der Grund liegt in der strukturellen Beschaffenheit der „Islamischen Republik“, weswegen für den „Revolutionsführer“ der Existenz der „totalen theokratischen Herrschaft“ absolute Priorität zukommt. Dies hat ja sogar Khomeini ausdrücklich betont und als sein Vermächtnis hinterlassen, wobei „für die Aufrechterhaltung des Systems sogar die primären Gebote des Islams suspendiert werden dürfen“.

Genau diese Systemerhaltung um jeden Preis ist – neben einer alles durchdringenden totalen Ideologie mit zentralen integrativen Feindbildern und der Schaffung eines neuen Menschentyps u.a. – eines der wesentlichen Merkmale des Totalitarismus. Nicht „die nationale Sicherheit Irans“ sondern „die Sicherung der absoluten Herrschaft des Theologen“ hat hier die absolute Priorität. Denn für die Islamisten ist nicht das iranische Volk und sein Staat die „Angriffs – und Verteidigungseinheit“ und das Objekt der Hingabe sondern die „Islamische Gemeinschaft“. Deswegen ist die „Islamische Republik“ als Staat auch nur „das Vaterland der Gläubigen“ („Om ol Ghora“), wie die Sowjetunion „das Vaterland der Werktätigen der Welt“ sein wollte. Damit verbunden ist die strategische Hoffnung auf eine Weltherrschaft „der wahren Gläubigen“

Damit verschiebt sich strukturell die Balance zwischen Verteidigungs- und Angriffscharakter des „Islamischen Staates Irans“ zugunsten seines Angriffscharakters. Äußerlich manifestiert sich dieser aggressive Charakter in der allgegenwärtigen Existenz der exterritorialen Einheiten der „Revolutionsgarde“ (Die Quds Revolutionsgarde), deren Aufgabe in der „Erweiterung der strategischen Tiefe“ der „Islamischen Republik“ bestehe. Kein Wunder, dass sich die Nachbarstaaten im Nahen und Mittleren Osten sich angesichts dieser informellen praktischen Grenzverschiebungen durch die revolutionären Stellvertreter der „Islamischen Republik“ gefährdet fühlen.

In diesem Sinne begreift sich Khamenei revolutionär als „Führer der Gläubigen der Welt“, dessen Aufgabe er in der Errichtung der Weltherrschaft der Muslime sieht. Für ihn ist deswegen die Welt eingeteilt in „das Haus des Islams“ („Dar ol Islam“) und in „Feindes Land“ (Dar ol Harb), dessen Unterwerfung die Aufgabe jedes wahren Gläubigen ist. Es ist dieses totalitäre Streben nach einer Weltherrschaft der islamistischen Schiiten mit ihren globalen und regionalen integrativen Feindbildern, die mittlerweile zur regionalen Verschärfung der Konfessionalisierung der Konflikte und damit zur Verschärfung der Stellvertreterkriege geführt hat.

Genau aus demselben totalitären Grund dürfen die Beziehungen zu Israel und den USA als „Erzfeinde“ nicht normalisiert werden. Denn eine totalitäre Herrschaft ist ohne integrative Feindbilder überhaupt nicht existenzfähig. Sie ist aber auch auf innerstaatlichen integrative Feindbilder angewiesen, die sie sich erneut schafft sobald welche eliminiert worden sind.

Aus diesem Doppelcharakter der „Islamischen Republik“ als Staat, an dessen Spitze ein „Weltrevolutionär“ steht, ergibt sich ein Spagat, der zwei Entwicklungstendenzen nahe legt. Sie manifestieren sich in zwei unterschiedliche Typen der Diktatur, autoritäre versus totalitäre, wie sie gegenwärtig Rohani und Khamenei als deren Träger repräsentieren.

Iran zwischen totalitärer und autoritärer Diktatur

Diese Entwicklungstendenzen sind das Ergebnis des Scheiterns der „Islamistischen Reformisten“ und der Wahl Rohanis als Kandidat der „Mitterechtkoalition“ der Kerngruppen der Macht in der „IR“.

Im Unterschied zum „Revolutionsführer“, strebt Rohanis „Regierung der Besinnung und Hoffnung“ außenpolitisch die „Reduzierung“ der Spannungen in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen insbesondere zu den USA und Saudi-Arabien an, um so die existentielle Gefährdung der „Islamischen Republik“ zu reduzieren. Aus diesen unterschiedlichen Orientierungen ergibt sich daher eine strukturelle Verschiedenheit der Politikstile, die sich auch in unterschiedlichen innenpolitischen Handlungsstrategien manifestieren. Während der „Führer“ weiterhin eine gnadenlose Stabilisierung seiner totalitären Herrschaft mit allen Mitteln anvisiert und mit der Verschärfung der Verfolgung, der Unterdrückung Andersdenkender und der Steigerung der Anzahl der Hinrichtungen demonstrieren will, dass sich mit dem Regierungswechsel nichts verändert hat, zielt die „Mitterechtskoalition“ Rohanis auf die Abschwächung des Totalitarismus hin zu einer „autoritären Diktatur“. Damit hoffen die moderateren konservativen Islamisten, das Regime auch innenpolitisch retten zu können; sie versuchen den Druck auf die Beherrschten zu reduzieren, mit dem sie sonst durch eine verordnete Hingabe zum Regime und zu dessen ideologisch vorgegebenen Zielen ihre „praktische Loyalität“ beweisen müssten. Neben vergeblichen zaghaften „Liberalisierungsversuchen“ des Alltagslebens, um die Entfremdung und totale Abwendung weiterer Teile der Bevölkerung zu verhindern, versprach Rohanis „überfraktionelle“ Regierung ebenso erfolglos gewisse „Bürgerechte“ und „Rechtsstaatlichkeit“, um die Eliminierung weiterer Teile der Kerngruppen der Macht zu verhindern. Diesem, dem totalitären Herrschaftsgebaren des „Führers“ konträren systemimmanenten Politikstil, wird aber von den radikal-konservativen Islamisten erheblicher Widerstand entgegen gesetzt, die mit dem „Führer“ weiterhin bloß einen Schein der „Rechtstaatlichkeit“ vortäuschen wollen. Sie sind außerdem nicht gewillt, ihr Streben, ihre Intervention in alle sozialen Bereiche, mit der sie einen „Islamischen Menschentyp“ im Sinne einer fundamentalistischen Lesart des Schiismus zu formen hoffen, zu reduzieren.

Damit soll die Etablierung einer autoritären Diktatur unter der Führung einer Mitterechtskoalition der Islamisten verhindert werden, die sich durch ihre außenpolitischen Erfolge und die Aufhebung der Sanktionen erhebliche Chancen bei den nächsten Parlamentswahlen versprechen. Dies setzt natürlich voraus, dass faire Wahlen stattfinden und die Kandidaten durch den „Wächterrat“ überhaupt zur Wahl zugelassen werden. Dies ist aber höchst unwahrscheinlich, weil mit dem außenpolitischen Erfolg das „Verfallsdatum“ der konservativen Mitterechtskoalition erreicht ist. Sollten Sie aber keinen außen- und wirtschaftspolitischen Erfolg vorweisen können, verlieren sie jegliche Wahlchance.

Von daher hängt die Normalisierung der außenpolitischen Beziehungen im Allgemeinen und die Lösung des Nuklearproblems im Besonderen nicht nur von solch einer institutionellen Verschiebung der Machtbalance ab, solange die verfassungsmäßig garantierten „Imperative des Führers“ („Hokm-e Hokumati“) unangetastet bleiben.

Aus diesem Grunde ist eine konstruktive Außenpolitik, eine friedliche Koexistenz mit Nachbarn und ein produktiver Beitrag Irans zur Lösung regionaler und internationaler Probleme nur durch eine institutionelle Demokratisierung Irans, getragen von überzeugten Demokraten, und Etablierung von rechtsstaatlichen Verhältnissen möglich. Die demokratische Überwindung einer totalitären Herrschaft ist aber erfahrungsgemäß ohne internationale Unterstützung, der Förderung der Menschenrechte und freien, fairen Wahlen ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit.

28.09.2014

http://gholamasad.jimdo.com/kontakt/

Iran’s Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi speaks to Cuban officials in Havana, Sept. 7, 2011. (photo by REUTERS/Desmond Boylan)

Iran’s judiciary this month sentenced former First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi to jail time for undisclosed corruption charges, the biggest scalp yet pulled from the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cadre.

Accusations of corruption in Iran rarely result in a conviction, unless there is a political interest in making them public. In this case, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who effectively controls the levers of justice in Iran, “has permitted Rahimi’s conviction, albeit without disclosing his crimes, to let out some steam and to try and convince the public that the system is taking corruption seriously,” a Tehran-based analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Al-Monitor.

But Rahimi, a system insider, is unlikely to face serious reprimand — misuse of funds in Iran usually occurs with the help of or within powerful networks. He will likely have leverage to negotiate a lighter sentence with the judiciary.

His conviction was in part made necessary because of the narrative woven by Hassan Rouhani’s new administration that the economic ills it inherited (5.4% growth and 44% year-on-year inflation) were due to unprecedented corruption under Ahmadinejad. It’s Ahmadinejad’s people who should be blamed for the bitter medicine Iran must swallow, such as subsidy reform and austerity

“Sanctions were a grave injustice to our nation,” Rouhani said in April. “Due to this pressure and injustice, both our nation and the world sustained losses. Unfortunately, a small minority benefited from the sanctions.”

There is some truth to this narrative. After Ahmadinejad, backed by Khamenei, emerged as the winner of the 2005 presidential elections, he regularly said his was the cleanest government since the revolution.

But his critics, who make up a considerable majority of the Iranian elite, accuse his cabinet of squandering oil revenues that in cash terms is nearly equal to what Iran had earned in the century prior to 2005. Aside from tapping the central bank’s petrodollars, Ahmadinejad’s people also reportedly made hay by exploiting the sanctions through arbitrage after the 2012 currency crash and black market oil sales.

The new administration is trying to strike a balance. It wants to come clean about corruption within the Islamic Republic by encouraging litigation against individuals — and making political capital in the blame game — while still preserving the system’s integrity by keeping most of the graft hidden from the public.

Rahimi is emblematic of the corruption surrounding Ahmadinejad.

As vice president, Rahimi faced further allegations that he was the head of the “Fatemi Street Ring” accused of embezzling millions of dollars but action against him was reportedly halted by Khamenei. Although a dozen junior officials were handed long prison sentences, up to life-imprisonment.

Before this, as the ground was being prepared by the conservatives for a win by the Principlist bloc, headed by Ahmadinejad, Rahimi was tasked with heading the Majles’s Bureau of Accounts (MB). Journalists and MPs accuse Rahimi of blackmailing the board of the National State Insurance Co. with an MB report accusing the insurance giant of financial impropriety, forcing the directors to sign off millions of dollars into accounts he controlled. Because Rahimi was appointed as vice president after Ahmadinejad won, speculation abounds that he ran an illicit slush fund to help secure the president’s ascent.

Another major figure that has been arrested on graft charges is multibillionaire tycoon Babak Zanjani. Oil Minister Bizhan Namdar-Zanganeh says Zanjani owes his ministry $2.7 billion, which was lent to his First Islamic Investment Bank in Malaysia as project finance to hire developers to work in Iran’s creaking oil sector but never paid back. Zanjani is also accused of failing to return profits to the public purse from black market oil deals after being gifted millions of barrels of cut-price crude to sell after the EU imposed an oil embargo on the Islamic Republic in 2012. Zanjani has said he transferred $17 billion of the oil money back to Iran but some transactions were stuck in his foreign accounts because of the sanction regime. His few supporters call him a national hero who used his business connections to help Iran claw back the cash deprived of it from the unjust sanctions.

Iranian economists say that secret oil deals like this, which involved labelling Iranian crude as other countries’ oil or selling to Asian navies that could avoid the US-led sanctions more easily, could have cost the Iranian public $20 billion. Economists also say this pales into insignificance compared to the some $200 billion in petrodollars that Ahmedinajad’s administration allegedly tapped from the central bank for white elephant projects such as the botched Maskan-e Mehr housing project to build 600,000 low-income homes across the Islamic Republic.

Reliable data on Iranian graft are hard to come by. Iran ranked 144 out of 177 countries in Transparency International’s perceived corruption index, on par with Nigeria and the Central African Republic. According to Revenue Watch, Iran is “failing” in all of its governance indices: institutional and legal setting; reporting practices; safeguards and quality controls; and enabling environment.

“Corruption, or what in the Iranian political discourse is described as ‘political rent,’ is endemic in Iran,” Farideh Farhi, an Iran scholar at the University of Hawaii, formerly at Tehran University, told Al-Monitor. “Ahmadinejad’s presidency took it to a new level for two reasons: The folks that came to power were hungrier than the previous crowd given their newness to political power, and there was more money to play with because of unprecedented high oil prices prior to the drop in exports caused by the sanctions.” But Farhi contends that “corruption has happened during previous presidencies as well.”

Indeed, centrist and Reformists are hardly immune to corruption allegations. For example, Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani, son of the former president and a mentor to Rouhani, is facing a closed-door trial for undisclosed graft charges (likely alleged kickbacks from oil giants Statoil and Total when he worked for the Reformist government of former President Mohammad Khatami).

“Iran’s unique political system provides unique opportunities for corruption,” one Tehran analyst said. “With so many centers of power — supreme leader, the president, parliament, the Guardian Council, the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], the clerics in Qom, the bonyads — there are more people to extract rents from the economy.”

“Iran is an oil economy and has very little accountability and a culture of political blackmail between the elites, including the judiciary, which means the public has very little knowledge of corruption unless it serves one group’s political purposes for them to do so,” said the source.

“The public has very little opportunity to collectively challenge these elites, as political parties are banned, as are trade unions.”

The supreme leader and his appointed justice minister will act, too, as breaks on meaningful open justice for the corruption that bedevils the Islamic Republic. It makes the country look bad. Yet it appears a few expendable heads will roll —​ perhaps literally — and that Rouhani may implement some anti-graft reforms. But without systemic judicial and democratic reform, Iran will struggle under the burden of corruption for the foreseeable future.

Source: AL-Monitor

The mother of an Iranian woman sentenced to death for killing her would-be rapist made a desperate plea to the government to spare her daughter’s life in a FoxNews.com interview Tuesday, just hours after the execution was postponed.

A distraught Shole Pakravan, whose daughter, Rayhaneh Jabbari, 26, has spent seven years in prison awaiting execution, spoke to FoxNews.com via Skype and begged for her daughter’s life.

“The only thing I want … from God, from people around the world … in any way, in any form, is I just want to bring Rayhaneh back home,” Pakravan said in Farsi, which was translated by FoxNews.com. “I wish they would come tie a rope around my neck and kill me instead, but to allow Rayhaneh to come back home.”

Jabbari was convicted in the 2007 fatal stabbing of Morteza Abdolali Sarbandi, a former employee of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry. Jabbari, who worked as a decorator and was just 19 at the time, says Sarbandi drugged her and tried to rape her after the two met at a cafe and she agreed to go to his office to discuss a business deal. Jabbari allegedly stabbed Sarbandi with a pocket knife and fled as he bled to death.

Jabbari’s execution was postponed in April in the wake of pressure from the international community, including a petition with nearly 200,000 signatures. But Jabbari believes her execution is imminent, and her mother says after Jabbari called her to tell her the prison planned to carry out her sentence, she was handcuffed and taken away.

“In reality, they didn’t want her to have any contact with her family and they didn’t want her cellmates to even see,” Pakravan said. “I told her, ‘Rayhaneh, this is impossible! It’s illegal! They can’t do this! Your case is up for re-evaluation. None of this makes sense!’ … Rayhaneh replied, ‘My dearest mother, you can rationalize this however you’d like, but they are taking me to kill me.’”

Pakravan and her family have been protesting outside of Rajaiy Shahr Prison in hopes of drawing attention to Jabbari’s case.

“The only thing I want in this universe is for Rayhaneh to be released. I have done everything I can think of,” Pakravan said. “I am a mother. No mother can accept the death of her child.”

The desperate plea came as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is in New York meeting with world leaders at the UN General Assembly, and seeking to put a moderate face on the repressive regime. Supporters of Rouhani hoped his election last year would usher in a more tolerant era than the one of his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, particularly regarding human rights. But advocacy groups say the number of executions and violations have increased.

The death sentence for Jabbari has gained widespread condemnation from human rights groups who say it exemplifies Iran’s backward legal and punitive system.

“This abhorrent execution must not be allowed to take place, particularly when there are serious doubts about the circumstances of the killing,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Middle East and North Africa deputy director at Amnesty International. “Instead of continuing to execute people, authorities in Iran should reform their judicial system, which dangerously relies on processes which fail to meet international law and standards for fair trial.”

Earlier this week, Mohsen Amir Aslani, a former psychologist was executed for heresy in Iran after eight years in prison for allegedly giving religious classes where he propagated a new interpretation of the Koran. He was also accused by the authorities of insulting the Prophet Jonah.

Watch the full interview with Shole Pakravan in the video above.

FoxNews.com’s Lisa Daftari contributed to this report.

Anlässlich aktueller Meldungen über den kritischen Gesundheitszustand von neun inhaftierten und seit einem Monat hungerstreikenden Anhängern des mystischen Nematollahi-Gonabadi-Ordens, Angehörige einer religiösen Minderheit in Iran, erklärte der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Menschenrechtspolitik und humanitäre Hilfe im Auswärtigen Amt, Christoph Strässer, heute (02.10.):

Zusatzinformationen

Mit größter Besorgnis erfüllen mich Berichte über den kritischen Gesundheitszustand der neun inhaftierten Anhänger des Nematollahi-Gonabadi-Ordens. Diese waren aus Protest gegen anhaltende Repressionen gegenüber Angehörigen der religiösen Sufi-Minderheit in Iran vor einem Monat in Hungerstreik getreten.
Iran hat sich mit der Ratifizierung des Internationalen Paktes über bürgerliche und politische Rechte verpflichtet, auch das Menschenrecht auf Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit zu achten und zu schützen. Die Unterdrückung religiöser Minderheiten steht dazu in eklatantem Widerspruch.
Ich fordere Iran auf, seiner Verpflichtung nachzukommen, die Menschenrechte Aller unabhängig von religiöser oder ethnischer Zugehörigkeit zu achten und alle Personen, die aufgrund ihrer religiösen oder politischen Weltanschauung inhaftiert sind, unverzüglich frei zu lassen.
Darüber hinaus appelliere ich an alle Verantwortlichen in Iran, den Hungerstreikenden umgehend dringend benötigte medizinische Behandlungen zu gewähren.

Hintergrund:

Die Situation für ethnische und religiöse Minderheiten in Iran ist besorgniserregend. Während Juden, Christen und Zoroastrier laut der iranischen Verfassung als religiöse Minderheiten anerkannt sind und zumindest offiziell Religionsfreiheit genießen, werden Angehörige mystischer Orden innerhalb des Islams (z.B. des schiitischen Nematollahi-Gonabadi-Ordens), auch Sufis oder Derwische genannt, häufig diskriminiert oder durch gewaltsame Übergriffe an ihrer Religionsausübung gehindert.

Anfang September 2011 gab es schwere Übergriffe der Sicherheitskräfte in vielen Landesteilen, v.a. in Kavar, im Zuge derer eine Vielzahl von Sufis sowie Mitarbeiter der zum Nematollahi-Gonabadi-Orden gehörigen Website „Majzooban-e-Noor“  und deren Verteidiger festgenommen wurden. Neun der Inhaftierten – zu Haftstrafen von viereinhalb bis zehneinhalb Jahren verurteilt – sind aus Protest gegen die andauernde landesweite Verfolgung des Nematollahi-Gonabadi-Ordens und gegen die schlechten Haftbedingungen am 31.08.2014 in Hungerstreik getreten. Es handelt sich um die im Teheraner Evin-Gefängnis inhaftierten Omid Behrouzi, Mostafa Daneshjou, Afshin Karampour, Farshid Yadollahi, Mostafa Abdi, Reza Entesari, Amir Eslami, Hamidreza Moradi Sarvestani sowie Kasra Nouri im Nezam-Gefängnis Shiraz. Ihnen wurde u.a. „Propaganda gegen das Regime“ und „Handeln gegen die nationale Sicherheit“ vorgeworfen.

Prison authorities ordered the crowd to leave and assured Jabbari’s family that she was not to be hanged — a statement the authorities commonly make before an execution so it can be carried out quietly, without incident.

Meanwhile, Ayatollah Boroujerdi has been taken from his prison cell in Evin to be executed and is being held incommunicado at an undisclosed location. Also “missing” is dissident blogger Mohammad Reza Pour Shajari and prominent student activist Arash Sadeghi, both presumed to have been re-arrested according to friends and family.

The “mainstream media” and so-called Human Rights Groups have, as usual, remained silent. The regime tells the media that information about “missing” prisoners is inaccurate in order to prevent publication of the news.

The Iranian killing machine seems to be counting on the reluctance of the U.S. to intervene in any serious way, in order to run its nuclear weapons program to completion.

Iran continues to hide behind the world’s focus on ISIS to accelerate political arrests, executions, “prison cleansing” and above all, its program to achieve nuclear capability.

Iran seems to be counting on the reluctance of the United States to intervene in any serious way, in order to run its nuclear weapons program to completion.

From left to right: Mohammad Reza Pour Shajari, Arash Sadeghi, Reyhaneh Jabbari, Ayatollah Hossein Kazamani Boroujerdi

Most recently, according to the International Committee Against Execution, Reyhaneh Jabbari, who was transferred to Rajai Shahr Prison to be hanged on Monday September 29, has been returned to her cell in Shahr-Ray Prison. Her execution was halted only to be re-scheduled for Oct 8, 2014.

On September 29, Jabbari was seized by prison guards during her shower, forced to dress and told that she would be hanged in the morning. After the prison staff allowed her to make one last phone call to her mother, she was transferred to Rajai-Shahr prison and placed in solitary confinement to await execution at dawn.

Upon her daughter’s transfer, Jabbari’s mother, Shole Pakravan, rushed to Rajai-Shahr prison with her husband, two daughters and a few friends. In front of the prison a crowd grew quickly to protest Jabbari’s execution. Prison authorities ordered the crowd to leave and assured Jabbari’s family that she was not to be hanged — a statement the authorities commonly make before an execution so it can be carried out quietly, without incident. Shole Pakravan refused to leave the premises until her daughter was transferred unharmed back to her original cell in Shahr-Ray Prison.

Meanwhile, the news spread through social media quickly, among a number of Italian, American and Swedish online news agencies. Additionally, the European Union, United Nations, along with most human rights organizations were alerted to the imminent execution. As a result, her execution was halted — but re-scheduled for Oct 8, 2014. Perhaps the Iranian regime is hoping her case will be overlooked by then amidst headlines dominated by ISIS.

Jabbari was sentenced to death when she was 19 years old for stabbing a man who tried to rape her. Human rights activists have been demanding the reversal of her death sentence and subsequent release from prison, as she acted in self-defense. Islamic law, however, rarely recognizes self-defense, especially in cases of rape. Many women have already been executed for defending themselves; many more await execution.

Meanwhile, Ayatollah Hossein Kazamani Boroujerdi has been taken from his cell in Evin Prison to be executed, and has since been “missing.” The Iranian regime does not allow the media inside Iran to report on missing prisoners; deeming the information inaccurate and propaganda against the regime.

Also “missing” is Mohammad Reza Pour Shajari; who was re-arrested a few days, ago according to his daughter. The regime is denying the arrest and any knowledge of Mr. Pour Shajari’s disappearance.

Arash Sadeghi, a prominent political student activist, was arrested a few hours after posting comments on his Facebook page criticizing the regime, according to a source close to Sadeghi who was interviewed by Gatestone Institute and wishes to remain anonymous:

“Yes, they come for him and the rest of us who had been involved in the uprising of 2009. They are arresting everyone… mass arrests inside Iran of anyone who opposes them now or has opposed them in the past. They are counting on ISIS to distract the world from this systematic cleansing… luckily I was not home and was not arrested. We have no idea where Arash is, I just know that they arrested him hours after his Facebook comments… I also fear they are torturing him all over again… he is very frail, only 60 kilos now after what they did to him in prison last time. “

There has been no news of Sadeghi since his arrest on September 6, 2014. Iran is evidently escalating the cleansing of its prisoners — political and non-political alike; many prisoners have apparently been taken to Rajai Shahr prison to await execution.

Meanwhile, the “mainstream media” and so-called Human Rights groups have, as usual, been silent.

Source: 

The Rouhani Meter is an attempt to monitor the performance of the recently elected president Rouhani by documenting what has been achieved as opposed to his promises.

https://rouhanimeter.com/media/RM-Infographics-English-1.pdf

73 Recorded Promises to Date

Socio-Cultural (23)

Since Rouhani took office, the human rights situation has not improved as some had hoped, but has actually worsened in a number of critical ways. For example, the pace of executions has increased to more than two a day in what can only be described as an “execution binge.”

Rouhani has also not fulfilled his promise to ease Internet restrictions, with Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube remaining blocked for Iranian citizens. In May, six young men and women were arrested and detained in Tehran for posting a tribute video to Pharrell Williams’ hit song, “Happy,” on YouTube.

The presidency of Hassan Rouhani is being carefully analyzed for signs that the Iranian regime is changing its dangerous and threatening behavior. Optimism in some circles has been encouraged by a change in rhetoric and tone from Rouhani and other senior regime figures. However, while the new Iranian President speaks the language of conciliation, as it stands, the regime’s nuclear program and odious behavior continue.

UANI released a comprehensive report on Rouhani’s first 100 days in office, analyzing whether Rouhani had brought demonstrable change in three key areas: Iran’s nuclear program, human rights and role in Syria. Unfortunately, UANI found that President Rouhani’s record during his first 100 days in office failed to match his promising rhetoric. UANI developed the 100 Days concept in conjunction with Congressmen Ed Royce and Eliot Engel, Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, respectively. They publicized the concept in a September 25 op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, “U.S. needs action, not words, from Iran.”

As Rouhani’s presidency progresses, UANI will continue to carefully scrutinize his record in office to see if his rhetoric matches his actions. The “Rouhani Accountability Tracker” reviews the day-to-day actions of the Iranian regime.

	YES	NO
Suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects” as it is required to do under UN Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929.
“Comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement.”
Resolve “the outstanding issues, including those related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program” in order “to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.”
“Act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003” and “ratify promptly the Additional Protocol.”
Refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology.”
Comply with “the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement,” which requires Iran to submit “design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier.”
Provide the IAEA immediate access to the Parchin site, where intelligence indicates “Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments; such experiments would be strong indicators of possible nuclear development.”

	YES	NO
Cooperate with Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, and allow him immediate entry into the country.
End Internet censorship and permit access to blocked social media websites like Facebook and Twitter that regime officials themselves use.
End the morality police’s harassment of Iranian citizens and routine violations of Iranians’ human rights.
End discrimination and harassment against persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Baha’i.
Decriminalize consensual same-sex activity between adults.

	YES	NO
Does Iran continue to provide the ruthless Syrian regime, which has used chemical weapons against its own people, with extensive military and economic support in order to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power?

Source: UANI

| Justice for Iran (JFI) highlights urgent concerns in submission to the 20th session of UPR Working Group on Islamic Republic of Iran.

On 8 October, just days ahead of Iran’s second Universal Periodic Review (UPR), JFI will make one of six presentations selected to inform UN delegates from around the world about the situation of human rights in Iran. During a Pre-Session event organized by UPR Info, the foremost NGO focused on this process, Shadi Amin, the co-founder of JFI and coordinator of Iranian Lesbian and Transgender Network (6Rang) will deliver a statement based on JFI’s UPR submission. Amin will focus on the plight of LGBT citizens in Iran and, in particlar, her statement will address the issue of medicalisation of sexual orientation and gender identity. JFI will also invite states to make specific recommendations on sexual orientation and gender identity, including:

Pending full decriminalisation of same-sex sexual relations remove the death penalty and flogging for offences relating to consensual same-sex relations between adults;

• Protect gender non-conforming people from harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture and other ill-treatment, whether by state or non-state actors;
• Adopt a comprehensive legislation to streamline legal sex change procedures and protect the right to health of transsexuals, without imposing sterilisation and genital reassignment surgeries as a prerequisite for gender legal recognition;
• Outlaw reparative therapies including electric shock therapies and psychoactive medications aimed at converting people’s sexual orientation and gender identity;
• Exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and hold accountable surgeons who administer substandard or negligent sex reassignment surgeries without informed consent or in reckless disregard of international standards of care for transsexual people;
• Respect the right to receive and impart health information including on sexual and reproductive matters;
• Stop hate speech against people of diverse sexual orientation and gender identity.

In addition, JFI’s recommendations on a variety of issues involving women’s rights, such as early marriage, right to bodily cover, reproductive rights and sexual torture will be made available to delegations attending the UPR pre-session.

Over the months of September and October, JFI experts have met with close to forty representatives of various member states of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, and based on victim testimonies, documents, survivor interviews and documents shared details of human rights violations in Iran. As its first priority, JFI briefs member states about the fact that a mere 3 recommendations put forward to Iran during the first UPR in February 2010 were focused on LGBT rights. To remedy this deficit, JFI is pointing out the root-cause of this series of violations by highlighting at the UN level Iran’s policies to wrongfully medicalise sexual orientation and gender identity. To better raise awareness at the international level JFI advocacy contextualizes the violation of sexual rights of LGBT within the framework of gender-based policies of the Islamic Republic that treat women or femininity as inferior.

With regards to its next priority, that of women’s rights, JFI briefs member states that regardless of Iran’s decision to accept a number of recommendations focused on women’s rights during the first UPR, it has failed to deliver any measure of improvement. In particular, JFI emphasised that the rights of women and girls in Iran require far more discussion and action at the international level.

The presentations and presenters will inform participating States as they prepare their recommendations for Iran’s UPR review. JFI will maintain its active participation as a leading voice in the 2014 Iran UPR. More information on this significant process will be reflected in JFI’s work during the coming weeks.

Background information

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a new phenomenon in the world of human rights. It refers to a four-year cycle of cooperative review of the human rights records of all UN member states. Under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, it is lead by nations, meaning each state has the right to declare what actions they have taken to improve their human rights record in order to better align their national policies and praxis with their human rights obligations, and to address human right violations.

Iran’s first UPR took place in February 2010. A total of 53 delegations made 189 recommendations to Iran, 123 of which were accepted, while according to the Islamic Republic 21 were already implemented or in the process of implementation, and an additional 20 were under review, but 45 important recommendations were entirely rejected.

For more information please see:

Full text of JFI statement delivered at the UPR Pre-session

Medicalisation of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (JFI brief and recommendations on LGBT rights)

JFI brief and recommendations on LGBT rights in Iran

JFI brief and recommendations on early marriage in Iran

JFI brief and recommendations on right to bodily cover

JFI brief and recommendations on reproductive rights

JFI brief and recommendations on sexual torture

JFI’s UPR submission: Disciplining Bodies, Diagnosing Identities, Mandatory Veiling, Mandatory Sterilization, Sexual Torture and the Right to Bodily Integrity in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Impact Iran Coalition and International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran draw attention to Iran’s upcoming human rights review
October 14, 2014— Impact Iran, a coalition of human rights organizations, in partnership with the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, today launched a new video, “Promises Made, Promises Broken.” The video is part of a series aimed at drawing attention to Iran’s second Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council on October 31, 2014. A new video will be released each week leading up to the review.

Their first video features nine persecuted Iranians who powerfully tell their stories of repression, harassment, detainment and torture in their own words. While these activists, bloggers, lawyers and students put a face to Iran’s human rights abuses, their stories are shared by many Iranians whose rights are violated every day.

“’Promises Made, Promises Broken’ tells the story of Iran’s human rights abuses through the compelling personal accounts of those who have experienced firsthand what it is like to live with this level of repression,” said Hadi Ghaemi, executive director of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran. “These individuals were targeted because of their religious beliefs, their peaceful rights advocacy, their sexual orientation, and their ethnicity, which goes against all of Iran’s human rights commitments.”

Despite the fact that Iran accepted 126 recommendations from UN Human Rights Council member countries at its last UPR in 2010, it has not honored the majority of these commitments, and violations continue to occur. For example, Iran agreed to improve protections against torture and ill treatment of detainees. However, several of the Iranians featured in “Promises Made, Promises Broken” report being victims of physical and psychological torture during their unjust detainments. The video calls on viewers throughout the international community to raise their voices and hold Iran accountable for its track record on human rights.

An analysis of Iran’s UPR commitments is available at www.ImpactIran.org and www.UPRIran.org.

“As Iran’s second UPR approaches, it has never been more important that we take measures to ensure the Iranian government keeps its human rights promises,” said Mani Mostofi, Director of Impact Iran. “This video series puts human faces to each of Iran’s repressive practices and urges viewers to raise their voices in solidarity with these persecuted Iranians to hold Iran accountable.”

#UPRIRAN #UPR20

Source: International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran

European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton (3rd L) delivers a statement during a ceremony next to British Foreign Secretary William Hague, Germany’s Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, US Secretary of State John Kerry, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (L-R) at the United Nations in Geneva, Nov. 24, 2013. (photo by REUTERS/Denis Balibouse)

The Israeli and Iranian publics can live with what their leaders each consider a “bad” nuclear deal.

Let’s start with Israel. There, the consensus is that the offer from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) to Iran is similar to a deal recommended by Robert Einhornof the Brookings Institution in Washington.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believed that the current P5+1 offer, which if Tehran accepted would leave it with a limited enrichment capacity on its soil, would be a “bad” deal. He has in fact stated that such a deal would be “catastrophic,” despite the deal’s requirement that Iran’s nuclear facilities be placed under some of the most stringent inspections possible by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

This attitude ignores numerous estimates that if Iran accepted the P5+1 offer, it would take a minimum of six months to a year to make a weapon with the limited number of centrifuges left on its soil, if and when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei decides to give the order.

Leaving Iran with limited enrichment capacity is not an ideal situation for many Israelis. Ideally, the majority of Israelis would most probably prefer that the current Iranian regime, which has repeatedly called for the elimination of Israel, be left without a nuclear program. Most would probably prefer that the current regime in Iran be toppled and replaced with a democratic government.

However, none of this is likely to happen anytime soon. It’s extremely unlikely that Iran would agree to dismantle its entire nuclear program. There is also no sign of an imminent democratic revolution in Iran.

Therefore, if the deal being proposed by the P5+1 is accepted by Iran, would the Israeli public demand war? Would it turn against its own politicians for not stopping such a deal?

Highly unlikely. One major reason is that such a deal would address major concerns of the Israeli public regarding Iran’s nuclear program. These concerns include halting the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program while making it difficult and costly for Iran’s leadership to decide to make a nuclear weapon.

The Israeli public also has other priorities. When Israelis went to the polls last time in January 2013, according to a poll conducted and published by The Times of Israel, only 12% saw Iran as the most urgent issue. The biggest group, 43%, cited economic concerns as its top priority. There is no evidence to suggest that these priorities have changed since then.

The same applies to Iran. Its most powerful figure, and the person with the last word regarding the nuclear program, has publicly set out his 11 red lines regarding the nuclear negotiations.

One of the most notable of these holds that an agreement must enable Iran to ultimately expand its enrichment capacity to 190,000 separative work units. This means that instead of its 9,000 currentfunctioning centrifuges, Iran should be allowed to add approximately 180,000 next-generation centrifuges.

Therefore, anything less would be considered a “bad deal” for him.

So what would happen if Iran accepted the P5+1’s offer to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its soil in return for Iran halving the number of its operating centrifuges and agreeing to tougher inspections? Would the people of Iran revolt against their government? Would they insist their government reject such an offer at the cost of living under continued sanctions and isolation?

Highly unlikely. We have to remember that when it comes to the nuclear program, the voice and opinion of the people of Iran have a minuscule if any impact on the regime’s elite that designs the country’s nuclear strategy.

It’s not that the people of Iran don’t want to have an impact; they do. In most cases, they are prevented from doing so by the ruling elite.

There are several cases that prove this point.

First and foremost, calls for a referendum over the nuclear program have been rejected. Then there is the fact that the regime does not even allow any debate in the press, especially any that presents ideas that run counter to the establishment’s narrative regarding the nuclear program. When Tehran University professor Sadegh Zibakalam did counter the narrative by publicly stating that he does not see any benefit in Iran’s current nuclear program, he received a suspended sentence of 18 months in prison.

If the Iranian nuclear program belonged to the people of Iran, it would be they who would set the negotiations’ red lines, and not an unelected official such as Ayatollah Khamenei. But this is not the case.

If the leaders of the Islamic Republic are confident of the public’s backing when it comes to their current nuclear strategy, why do they prevent public debate? Why do they sentence to jail those who dispute their narrative? Why not allow a referendum? Iran would not be the first country to hold a referendum regarding its civilian nuclear program. The answer seems clear: Iran’s leadership does not believe that it has the public’s backing for its current nuclear strategy.

Although there have been a number of polls inside Iran, including a July survey by the University of Tehran and University of Maryland that showed public support for the current nuclear strategy of the Iranian government, there is reason to be skeptical of such polls.

In Iran, people can be sentenced to jail for countering the government narrative regarding the nuclear program, especially to an unknown stranger over the phone who has their contact details. In such an atmosphere, the fear factor could affect poll results.

Hassan Rouhani was elected on the platform of improving Iran’s economy and the welfare of Iranian citizens. One of his main campaign slogans regarding the nuclear program was that not only the nuclear program but the economy should also function and thrive.

Although Iran’s economy has improved somewhat since Rouhani entered office, numerous major problems still remain. Inflation is at 20%. Subsidies have been cut. Iran’s economy is still very much suffering because of sanctions, and a historic drought is on the way that will need many billions of dollars to manage.

Much as in the Israeli public, there are no indications that the priorities of the people of Iran have changed since the last legislative elections in the country. Again, like the people of Israel, economic issues seem as if not more important than the nuclear program to the Iranian public. Both populations want the situation to de-escalate, and for their leaders to address other important domestic issues.

The people of both Iran and Israel could live with the P5+1’s current offer to Iran. It’s now up to their leaders, especially the supreme leader of Iran, who has the last word on Iran’s nuclear program.

Source: AL-Monitor

Judiciary chief Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani arrives at Iran’s Assembly of Experts’ biannual meeting in Tehran, March 8, 2011. (photo by REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi)

The head of Iran’s judiciary cautioned the Iranian media about coverage of economic corruption cases, in particular warning against publishing the names of ministers affiliated with the administration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and said that the prosecutor’s office had been given orders to press charges against any outlet that commits an illegal act during its coverage of the corruption cases.

“Some in the media and some officials have started to say that corruption is everywhere,” said Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani Oct. 12. “This is contrary to reality. That newspapers reinforce this is a mistake, and it leads to hopelessness among the people, and this issue is a national security issue.”

Using a pejorative to describe Reformist media, Larijani said, “The chain newspapers print the names of individuals from cases that are still with the prosecutors and write in their headlines that some ministers were caught up in this case.”

He said that information on open cases should not be published early and warned, “I gave the prosecutor’s office orders to monitor these media and to not give up on whatever is against the law and even to issue a summons if necessary.”

Larijani’s comments were aimed at the media coverage of statements made by judicial spokesman Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei on Oct. 6. While discussing the corruption case of billionaire Babak Zanjani, who had been tasked with helping Iran evade sanctions by discretely selling its oil, Mohseni-Ejei said, “In this case, the names of three ministers from the previous administration and the head of the central bank were presented and in regard to these four individuals, research was conducted.”

These comments made the front page of a number of Reformist newspapers, many of which had been under intense pressure during the Ahmadinejad administration, particularly from Culture Minister Mohammad Hosseini.

Conservative website Mashregh News took this opportunity to attack the Reformist press for its coverage of Mohseni-Ejei’s statements. It reported, “Based on the daily observations of the for-hire Reformist chain media, Mashregh became aware of a coordinated cooperation by these media.”

In its article, headlined, “Which media was Larijani warning?” Mashregh published screenshots of the front pages of six Reformist newspapers that ran the corruption case and the ministers implicated as their top stories. The article claimed that these outlets, all of which support the administration of President Hassan Rouhani, ignore other cases of corruption and give special coverage to these because they involve Ahmadinejad’s administration. Mashregh’s outrage, however, bypassed its own coverage. The news organization not only published the comments by Mohseni-Ejei on Oct. 6 but also featured them in a top headline.

In response to Larijani’s comments, well known editor and translator Khashayar Dayhimi wrote a very harsh letter to Larijani entitled “A lawless country.” He wrote that when the corruption case involving Ahmadinejad’s vice president becomes known to everyone, a case he called “one of thousands,” then the media can’t be accused of making the corruption seem bigger than it really is. In regard to Larijani’s comments about people becoming “hopeless” about the situation, he wrote, “The people have already made their judgments and they will do so again.”

Source: AL-Monitor

Then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (C) attends National Army Day parade in Tehran, April 18, 2013.  (photo by REUTERS/Hamid Forootan/ISNA/Handout)

Medical staff work in an operating room of the Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ahvaz in Khouzestan, Iran, Dec. 6, 2010. (photo by Wikimedia Commons/Florence)

Over 25,000 Iranian patients are on the waiting list for receiving an organ, according to the latest statistics that Iran’s Ministry of Health has announced. Official statistics show that every day, seven to 10 patients on this list die in dire need of an organ transplant.

The administration has increased its efforts to inform and educate people to willingly become donors, which is why the donor card system was created. A section that has also been added to driver’s licenses in Iran that indicates the license holder’s decision to donate his/her organs.

“Starting on Sept. 21, 2014, no more organ transplant operations will be performed on non-Iranians,” Iranian officials announced in September.

The major reason this decision was made, according to the Ministry of Health, was that the number of foreign citizens who have undergone organ transplant surgery in Iran — 608 legally documented over the past 10 years — was already high, considering the number of Iranian patients in critical condition.

In an interview with Al-Monitor, Dr. Nader S., a nephrologist and experienced transplant specialist in Shiraz, said, “In the private hospital where I am a major share-holder, we had a few cases of foreigners who would travel to Iran and buy a kidney from healthy, broke folks through middlemen and kidney dealers, and then would undergo transplant surgery in our hospital, which is a big, modern, well-equipped hospital, also quite costly; but the latter was obviously no big deal for these people.”

Another recent development has been banning private hospitals from performing transplant surgeries (starting last month), and limiting these procedures to public and teaching hospitals.

The reasons stated for the decision to limit organ transplant surgeries to public and teaching hospitals is to stop what Iran’s health officials refer to as numerous counts of misconduct and abuse of the system, as well as the need for better regulation of transplant procedures and finally, access to better, updated and high-tech equipment in public and teaching hospitals.

A controversial aspect of the topic of transplant is the religious aspect. While there have been differences of opinion among Iranian Shiite clerics about this matter in the past, the organ transplant bill (regarding transplanting organs from the bodies of brain-dead patients) that passed in Iran’s Majles (parliament) in 2000, further paved the way for the procedure. There are still mixed views concerning the details, but Iranian clerics generally accept the procedure. The matters in which nuances become apparent are transplanting the organ(s) of a male to a female or vice-versa, and transplanting organs of a non-Muslim to a Muslim, or vice-versa.

In an interview with Al-Monitor, Mohsen Kadivar, a philosopher and Iranian dissident cleric, expressed his opinion on the matter: “Iranian clerics are quite advanced in this regard. Wahhabis, on the other hand, could be quite harsh on rejecting the idea of transplanting organs. Although I have not studied their view on it in particular, one of the reasons that citizens of Saudi Arabia would have been inclined to travel to Iran for such procedures, other than Iran’s advanced medicine, may have been the difficulties they face in their own country, created by their clerics. I would say Orthodox Christians, too, are less open to what may be interpreted by some clerics as disrupting the acts of God. Personally, although I’d carefully consider the matter on a case-by-case basis, I’d generally say I am welcoming of saving a person’s life if there is a team of physicians pronouncing another person brain-dead. That is, if it is certain he is in a vegetative state, and if his next-of-kin allow the transplant.”

The Iranian government has made considerable efforts as of late, through ceremonies with celebrities in attendance (such as the annual “Nafas [Breath] Feast,” celebrating its 11th year in 2014), and public announcements to attract the population’s attention to the benefits of organ donation. Official statistics reveal that currently, 1,400,000 Iranians are registered donors.

Another task Iranian health authorities are attempting to accomplish is persuading families to allow hospitals to proceed with the donation process. Despite being a registered donor, the next-of-kin’spermission is still required for the donation process to get started.

Zahra, 28, a homemaker in Kerman, told Al-Monitor, “I was on top of the waiting list for a heart transplant, in critical condition, and getting eerily closer to death almost by the hour. I later found out that although my donor was registered, at first his family would not allow the organs to be transplanted and the hospital had had a very tough time convincing them, especially his mother.”

Iran’s health authorities estimate the average time needed for donor organs to be extracted from the donor’s body to be 36 hours. Some conservative or traditional Iranian Muslims have mentioned that one of the reasons for their reluctance to allow the process is the necessary wait between death and the release of the body, which delays the burial of their loved one. Examining this reluctance in his interview with Al-Monitor, Kadivar said, “I don’t think of it as an obstacle. Fast burial is recommended in Islam because, at the time of this recommendation, morgues did not exist. Nowadays they do. Plus, the length of time many families spend on preparations or awaiting the arrival of other family members or relatives probably surpasses 36 hours, anyway. “

While progress has recently been made in the organ transplant domain in Iran, there still are, according to Iran’s Ministry of Health, numerous problems and shortcomings within the organ donation system in the country. The organs of an average of 2,500 brain-dead people out of 5,000 should be, under normal circumstances, transplanted. This number is only 665 in Iran: the low number being due to multiple issues, the most significant ones being shortage of equipment and surgeons in small towns, delay in obtaining permission from the families of the donors and miscommunication or lack of communication between relevant and responsible medical units. These issues beg serious attention, and gravely diminish the chances of patients in need of organ transplants of receiving them from donors.

Source: Al-Monitor

Die dauerhafte Unterbringung von Flüchtlingen in Lagern schafft Probleme – das zeigen nicht zuletzt die Misshandlungsfälle in Nordrhein-Westfalen. In Chemnitz geht man andere Wege: Flüchtlinge haben eigene Wohnungen – und jetzt auch Paten.

Chemnitz. Zu duftendem Tee und Kuchen reicht Rahimeh eine Schachtel Datteln über den Wohnzimmertisch. Im Wörterbuch schlägt die 37-jährige Iranerin das deutsche Wort für die Frucht nach, die ihr als Khorma bekannt ist. Mit Gesten warnt sie den Gast, nicht zu fest zuzubeißen, wegen des Kerns. Schokolade gebe es im Iran auch, klärt Rahimehs ältester Sohn Peyman auf: “Ist aber nicht gesund.” Zum Naschen seien Datteln besser, findet der 20-Jährige. Von seiner fünfköpfigen Familie, die im Dezember nach Chemnitz kam, ist Peyman mit seinen Deutschkenntnissen am weitesten fortgeschritten. “Das Beste an Chemnitz ist Runa. Ich weiß nicht, was wir ohne sie gemacht hätten”, sagt er.

Runa Richter sitzt auf dem Sofa und winkt ab. Sie habe nur getan, was ihre Aufgabe sei. Für den 2008 gegründeten Verein “Save me” vermittelt die 28-jährige Germanistik-Studentin in Chemnitz Patenschaften an Flüchtlingsfamilien. “Inzwischen gibt es das in 58 Städten” sagt sie. In Chemnitz begann das Projekt im September 2013. Bisher haben 25ausländische Familien ortskundige Paten. Ursprünglich bezog sich das Projekt allein auf die von den Vereinten Nationen zugewiesenen Resettlement-Flüchtlinge (siehe nebenstehender Beitrag). Da sich aber in Chemnitz schon weit über 70 Personen, vom Studenten bis zum Rentner, als Paten gemeldet haben, weitete man das Projekt jetzt auf Asylbewerberfamilien aus.

Für ihre iranische Familie ist Runa Richter erstmals selbst Patin. Sie erinnert sich an den Tag im Dezember, als sie sich im Chemnitzer Wohnheim zum ersten Mal begegneten: Vater Teimoor (47), Mutter Rahimeh, deren Söhne Peyman und Kamran und die sechsjährige Tochter Pegah. Da scheiterte die Kommunikation schon an der Übersetzung einfachster, fürs Leben in einer fremden Stadt aber elementarer Fragen: Wo ist ein Supermarkt? Sie ging mit “ihrer” Familie zum Flüchtlingsrat, wo Runa Richter nebenbei jobbt. “Ich wusste, mein Chef dort spricht persisch”, sagt sie. In den ersten Wochen bedurfte es stets eines Übersetzers. “Da haben die Vermittler vom Verein In- und Ausländer sehr geholfen”, sagt sie. Inzwischen besuchen alle Familienmitglieder täglich den Sprachunterricht der Integrationskurse an der Volkshochschule.

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von Sidney Gennies

Bild vergrößern

Die 26-jährige Reyhaneh Jabbari soll hingerichtet werden, weil sie den iranischen Geheimdienstmitarbeiter Morteza Sarbandi erstach. Der soll versucht haben, sie zu vergewaltigen. Am Mittwoch lehnte die Familie des Verstorbenen nun eine Begnadigung Jabbaris ab.

Die Familie des iranischen Geheimdienstmitarbeiters Morteza Abdolali Sarbandi will die Hinrichtung von Reyhaneh Jabbari. Die heute 26-jährige hatte Sarbandi 2007 mit einem Messer verletzt, er starb. Jabbari hatte geltend gemacht, sie habe in Notwehr gehandelt, weil Sarbandi sie vergewaltigen wollte.

Erstes Treffen zwischen Opfer-Familie und Verurteilter

Ein Teheraner Gericht verurteilte sie aber 2009 trotz großer internationaler Proteste zum Tode durch Erhängen.

Menschenrechtsorganisationen, EU-Vertreter und auch Anwälte in Iran bemängelten schwerwiegende Verfahrensfehler. Dennoch bestätigte der Oberste Gerichtshof 2014 das Urteil. Nach iranischem Recht kann nur die Familie des Verstorbenen Jabbari noch vor der Hinrichtung bewahren. Doch die lehnte am Mittwoch ab. Dies sagte der in Berlin lebende Onkel der Frau, Fariborz Jabbari, dem Tagesspiegel. Erstmals hatte es ein Treffen zwischen Jabbari selbst, ihrer Mutter und dem ältesten Sohn des Getöteten gegeben. Nach Angaben des Onkels der Verurteilten habe der Sohn die Vollmacht seiner Familie erhalten, Jabbari zu begnadigen oder den Weg für die Hinrichtung frei zu machen.

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